1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 The development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth
793 century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom
were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

795 The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the
793 Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan
197 archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of
these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.[2]

795 When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and
● 668 was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional
congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

[2] This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Carinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

795 adopting a conciliar form of government for the proposed church.
Despite the enactment of many resolutions calling for ecclesiastical
668 independence, little real progress was made during 1917, primarily because other matters of a more immediate nature, especially the agrarian problem and the demand for peace, absorbed public attention. Among other obstacles there was the hesitancy of many priests to challenge the established religious order and the lack of forthright support from the Ukrainian Central Council *(Ukrainska Central'na Rada)* which was the recognized representative body attempting to govern Ukraine at the time.

795 When the government of the Central Council was replaced by
669 that of Hetman Paul Skoropads'kyj in April of 1918 the official attitude toward the organization of a separate church became more sympathetic. A Ministry of Religious Cults was established under the direction of Professor Basil Zin'kivs'kyj, a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the University of Kiev. Plans were made to convoke a *sobor*, or general church conclave, but before this could be done it was necessary to select a new metropolitan archbishop of Kiev to succeed Metropolitan Vladimir, who had been murdered in February while the city was under Bolshevik rule. According to established procedure the metropolitan was to be elected at a diocesan congress, but Zin'kivs'kyj wished to depart from this practice and have all of the Ukrainian dioceses participate in the electoral meeting. His reason for making this request was that the Metropolitan of Kiev is regarded as the ranking hierarch in Ukraine and not merely as the head of another diocese.

However, the Church administration, which was in Russian hands at the time, proceeded to call an ordinary congress of the Kiev diocese thus ignoring Zin'kivs'kyj's proposal. In view of the nature of the Congress' membership it is not surprising that Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovits'kyj of Kharkov was elected. This did not please the Ukrainian nationalists because Anthony had forbidden the clergy of the Kharkov diocese to read the Gospel in Ukrainian, which he termed "a language of the market place." Zin'kivs'kyj wrote in vain to His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, requesting that Anthony's election be set aside. The new Metropolitan immediately made plans for his journey to Kiev with the intention of arriving there in the morning, but railway workers, who were aware of the hierarch's anti-nationalist views, delayed the train for nearly ten hours and prevented a ceremonial welcome planned by his supporters.[8]

The German-sponsored Skoropads'kyj Government continued to lend its support to the convocation of the All-Ukrainian *Sobor*

[8] Dmytro Dorošenko, *Istorija Ukrainy* (Užhorod, 1930), II, 322.

attention was concentrated on building up a system of social 642
economy within Russia, so that it was no longer necessary to 177
bear in mind national movements in western countries, for the .64
world revolution had been postponed for the meantime. The change in Ukraine took place gradually and in contradiction to public expressions of loyalty. The economic needs of Ukraine were ignored already in the first Five Year Plan, the educational system was restricted and the Academy of Learning came completely under communist influence. Ukrainian officials were replaced by Russians and the standing of Ukraine suffered. Russian, as the language of the Revolution, of Lenin and Stalin, was to be the language of one people which had hitherto used several languages, a fact that had concealed the inner unity that had actually existed.

This development caused a fresh outbreak of national resis- 668 ●
tance on the part of the Ukrainians. The movement of the rebels which had at first led to guerilla warfare, ceased about 1921-1922: factors responsible for the cessation of hostilities were the appointment of Ukrainian officials to the administration and the fact that the United Ukrainian Church was tolerated. When this also was forbidden and when the collectivist movement in the country met with the spontaneous resistance of the peasantry, a campaign of terrorism was re-started. "Nationalist" differences appeared even within party organisations: bolshevist dignitaries themselves could not keep clear of the Ukrainian movement. Thus in 1925 Shumskyj, commissary for education in the USSR, a very influential communist, was dismissed; in 1933 Skrypnyk, who held the same office and who was a personal friend of Lenin's, comitted suicide because he was unwilling to confess his "nationalist sins" to the party; his example was followed in 1937 by Lubtshenko, long president of the Council of People's Commissaries, in order not to fall into the hands of the GPU. The number of lesser communist dignitaries who were killed as nationalists or separatists is very great, and still greater is the host of those who did not belong to the communist ranks and who suffered the same fate in the struggle for national rights and political independence.

Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of 175
coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population increased considerably, all of which caused other national questions to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the 175
first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness 186
among the broad masses began to appear. In this year the 668
Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took 175
part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special 669
camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

000 and by the Russian Messianism which had transmuted Panslavism into Communism.

175* On the outbreak of war in 1914, the Ukrainian Question occupied a relatively minor place in the minds of political and military chiefs in Berlin and Vienna. At the same time both Berlin and Vienna contemplated an ultimate solution favourable to their respective views—views which differed in important essentials.

The course of events during the war obliged the Habsburg Monarchy to abandon all ambitious plans and to concentrate on the preservation of existing territory. The Germans, on the other hand, as the war developed, began to take the greatest interest in the Ukraine, especially after 1916 when German troops made their appearance in Podolia and Volhynia and when a year later, the Russian Revolution opened the way wide to the Dniepr and even to the Don. If at the beginning of the war the Ukraine was of interest primarily to Vienna, by the end it had been transferred into Berlin's field of vision.

Despite the drift towards Russia which had been noticeable among both Galician and Russian Ukrainian intellectuals after the Liberal reforms following the Revolution of 1905, Vienna had been encouraged by the weakness of Russia to supplement a more active policy in the Balkans by a more intense interest in the Ukrainians. The Slavs who remained 'loyal to the Habsburg Monarchy' and who were considered to have a historic aversion to Moscow—Poles and Ukrainians—assumed a certain importance.

• 668 A special periodical was founded in Vienna, *Ukrainische Rundschau*, and the Austro-Hungarian Government gave unofficial support to the so-called 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' which openly proclaimed the struggle against Russia and promised in case of war to contribute to Russia's defeat 'by internal upheavals'. The leaders of this Union were certain Ukrainians of some ability—Skoropis-Zholtukovsky, Zhuk, Doroshenko and Zaliznyak. The organization conducted a propaganda on a considerable scale and could dispose of adequate funds which were provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government and supplemented by contributions from prosperous Ukrainians in America. It was proposed that, in the case of war with Russia and the invasion of Russia by the Austrian armies, representatives of the Union, with the help of their supporters in the Russian Ukraine, should organize a form of government which would be acceptable to Vienna. Some hotheads were even talking of a 'Ukrainian kingdom', and named as candidate for the 'Ukrainian throne' Archduke Wilhelm of Habsburg 'Vasili Vishevaniy'.

000 German political circles took a more prosaic view of the Ukrainian

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175* predominated. The elections of 1907 had sent sixty-nine Polish deputies to the local *Seym*, and thirty-two Ukrainians. The results of the elections had been regarded as unjust by the Ukrainian political activists, and the struggle against the local Polish hegemony had been intensified; terrorist outrages had culminated finally in the assassination of the Viceroy of Galicia, Count Potocki. Finally, following the intervention of the Central Government in Vienna, the Ukrainians had secured an agreement whereby 27 per cent of the seats in the *Seym* were guaranteed to them in the future. The position was further complicated by the fact that a third of the Ukrainian deputies were stigmatized by their colleagues as 'pro-Russians' (*Promoskovity*).

175* The five years preceding the war were marked by an acute and growing antagonism, not only between Poles and Ukrainians, but also between the two sections within the local Ukrainian movement. Supported by the Vienna Government, and having at their disposal ten chairs in the University of Lvov, several gymnasiums, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the educational organization of *Prosvita*, libraries, museums, publishers and several daily papers, the anti-Muscovite 'separatists' were always the stronger; but now the movement which had been created by Hrushevsky and his followers was only defending its former positions. The *Promoskovity*, in spite of difficulties, were gaining ground; they had founded their own scientific institute, formed their own academic group, established their own daily papers and their own political 'Russian Organization'. In their struggle with the *Promoskovity* the separatists appealed to the Austro-Hungarian authorities, and in 1912 elaborate lists were prepared of persons suspected of sympathies for Russia.

175* 608 The events of the war changed in a most decisive manner all the relationships which had been established in Galicia. Simultaneously with mobilization began arrests of 'pro-Russians'. A few weeks later the defeats of the Austrian armies were attributed to 'the treacherous behaviour' of the Galician population. When complete units of Galician Landsturm surrendered without resistance to the enemy, repressions followed throughout the whole province: mass arrests and transportations, and executions—with or without the formality of military courts. All persons of any local importance who were considered 'pro-Russian' were sent to concentration camps—deputies of the *Seym*, priests, schoolmasters, business men and prosperous peasants. The Lvov prisons were filled with hundreds of prisoners who did not know why they had been arrested; and at the notorious camp of Telerhof 7500 unfortunates were interned.

175* The commander of the 8th Russian Army, General Brusilov,

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Galician political factions, but his authority was great among the 175 *
peasantry of Galicia and that authority might have been used to support the Russian administration had it shown more tolerance in Church affairs. But the Metropolitan was treated with more severity than the known separatist Hrushevsky; he was banished to Russia, where he had to live under provincial police supervision.

In Lvov, at the head of 'The Russian Committee', was a rather 668
anaemic personality, a certain Dudkevich. Owing to the blunders 175 *
of the Russian administration 'pro-Russian' tendencies did not make any progress during the period of the occupation. As for the Ukrainian separatist movement it was annihilated as a result of the war. 'The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' collapsed, and Doroshenko and Zaliznyak abandoned it. The attempt to form a Ukrainian Legion on the pattern of Pilsudski's Polish Legion had no success. Although the military importance of the Polish Legion was insignificant, the legionaries fought well and it served to form a nucleus for a future political organization. But no one ever heard anything about the military feats of the Ukrainian Legion of Austrian formation. Certain members of 'The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' found, however, new means to induce the Germans to take an interest in them.

When in 1915 the Germans captured enormous numbers of Russian prisoners an attempt was made to 'sort' them according to their national origins. Those who called themselves Ukrainians were sent to a special camp at Rastatt where lectures were read to them on Ukrainian subjects by a certain 'Professor' Bezpalko. At the beginning of 1917 about 15,000 Russian soldiers, who had qualified in German eyes as Ukrainians, were assembled in the camp at Rastatt and went through a sort of school of propaganda. A regiment even was formed, called the Taras Shevchenko regiment, numbering about 2000 men, but it did not have time to prove its valour on the German side before the Revolution broke out. When it is remembered that by the beginning of 1917 the number of Russian prisoners in the hands of the Germans was about 3,000,000, of whom between 700,000 and 800,000 were of Ukrainian origin, the success attained by the Germans in exploiting Ukrainian nationalism in the concentration camps does not appear very brilliant.

In the spring of 1915 the Emperor Nicholas II, after the surrender of Przemysl, visited Galicia and made a speech at Lvov in 175 *
which he spoke of 'an indivisible Russia' reaching as far as the Carpathian Mountains. There were already signs, however, that the Russian dominion in Galicia would not last long. In the early summer a heavy German concentration pierced the Russian front at

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208 ticularly prominent (Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Chenkeli really domi-
623 nated the first Petrograd Soviet).

● 668 At this early period the great majority of the Ukrainian population were really more indifferent to 'the Ukrainian movement' than they had been before the war. The soldiers in the trenches were only interested in two things: in an immediate return to their homes and in their participation in the land distribution which was to be a feature of the agrarian reforms in the new Russia. If in a comparatively short time 'the Ukrainian movement' became a factor of importance in revolutionary Russia, it was only owing to the exceptional energy and insistence of the small group of men who were leading the Ukrainian nationalists.

Already in March Professor Hrushevsky had made his appearance in Kiev; he was joined by one of the activists of 1905, Vinnichenko, who during that earlier phase had called himself a 'Ukrainian Social Democrat'. The journalist Simon Petlyura, who was destined to become the most picturesque of the Ukrainian leaders, also turned up in Kiev.(2) At the beginning of 1917 Petlyura had found himself in the modest post of accountant in one of the branches of the 'Union of the Towns' which, together with the 'Union of Zemstvos', had been largely concerned with the supply problems of the war. These two Unions became the stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalists; in Kiev alone there were 6000 people employed on the 'Union of Zemstvos' and 2000 on the 'Union of the Towns'. Branches of the two Unions existed in all the towns of the Ukraine and the staffs consisted for the greater part of 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'—just the social strata where, before the war, the Ukrainian nationalists had been gaining recruits.

Without losing any time, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko gathered round themselves in Kiev an active group who shared their ideas, and they began to organize a 'Ukrainian Conference'. The sponsors of the Conference sent 'invitations' to 'elect delegates' from the nine Governments which they considered as constituting the territory of the Ukraine (three Governments on the right and three on the left bank of the Dniepr and the three Governments of New Russia). The elections were held 'according to the Revolutionary ways': in other words, delegates arrived in Kiev on the authority of some small 'circle' or club or of a 'Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' which might have consisted of five or six people. There appeared also 'self-appointed delegates'—deserters from the Front and 'new-comers' from Galicia.

No one was particularly astonished at this strange assembly, since 'revolutionary enthusiasm' reigned supreme throughout the whole

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country. The Soviets and all sorts of other similar organizations 668 which were supposed to voice the aspirations of 'great masses' had been organized in the same way. Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, [646] however, attained their first object, since 'the Ukrainian Conference' elected from its midst members of 'the Ukrainian *Rada*' which was to constitute a sort of Parliament for the Ukraine. These events caused considerable displeasure to the Provisional Government in Petrograd and it was not long before a struggle developed between the Provisional Government and the Ukrainian *Rada*.

'Self-determination of nationalities' had always formed part of 668 the moral and political stock-in-trade of the various brands of 642 'liberals', 'democrats' and 'socialists' who composed the Provisional Government. But the realities of the situation in which they found themselves imposed on these ideologues a certain moderation in the application of their super-liberal principles. Harassed on all sides by self-constituted revolutionary and nationalist groups and factions, and themselves clinging nervously to the forms of an authority which was being rapidly dispersed by the cold winds of rising anarchy, the Provisional Government had recourse to their usual method of 'persuasion' and they asked the *Rada* to await the end of the war and the decisions of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

'Persuasion', however, was hopeless with opponents so skilled in political struggles and intrigue as Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko. Aware of the weakness of the Petrograd Government, the politicians of the *Rada* based their tactics on manœuvring for a gradual enlargement of the powers which they had attributed to themselves, while they avoided provoking the cabinet of Prince Lvov by premature demands of too drastic a nature. The *Rada* secured, for instance, the consent of the Provisional Government to the formation of Ukrainian national troops. In this case they could appeal to the precedent which had been created by the formation of Lettish, Georgian and Armenian national detachments.

Professor Paul Milyukov, a prominent member of the Provisional Government, describes the relations of Petrograd with the *Rada* in the following words: 'The Provisional Government was still continuing to plead with the Ukrainians not to detach themselves from the Motherland, not to go the fatal way of dividing liberated Russia, and not to introduce dissensions into the Army at a moment of great national danger. Weak and devoid of backbone, having itself laid down its arms, the Government could not but register *post factum* the triumphs attained by the Ukrainians. Hrushevsky's tactics consisted in proving that "nothing decisive" was taking place. The fiction that the Government was sanctioning the *Rada's* doings was

668 642 kept up to the end. Summing up all the *pourparlers* one sees how false they were at the core: an enforced fiction on one side and deliberate deception on the other.'

Hrushevsky, according to his own words, put forward only a moderate programme: wide national and territorial autonomy within the Russian Federative Republic; but it was not long before he was shifting his ground and declaring that 'the adherents of an independent Ukraine consent to remain on a common platform with Russians' but that 'the colours of an independent Ukraine would be folded only for a time'.

With the resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov, who were regarded as the firm adversaries of Ukrainian separatism, 'the colours of an independent Ukraine' were duly unfolded. The *Rada* chose from among its members a 'General Secretariat' which was to function as a sort of Ukrainian cabinet. Always in pursuance of their tactics, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko declared that the authority of both the *Rada* and the Secretariat was of a 'purely moral order' and that the organs set up in Kiev were purely 'national organizations'.

Soon, however, Vinnichenko, who had taken upon himself the role of 'Ukrainian Prime Minister', judged that the moment had arrived to proclaim that 'the limits between moral and public legal authority had been effaced' and that 'our moral authority has grown to such an extent as a logical result of events that painlessly, without a struggle, it has transformed itself into the legal rule of a national republic'.

All these manœuvres culminated in the publication of the first 'Universal' of the 'Central *Rada*' on 23 June 1917, according to which the 'Autonomous Ukrainian Republic' came into being, and the 'Central *Rada*' arrogated to itself the right to formulate legislation which would require the sanction of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly only as 'a matter of form'. In this way two authorities came into being claiming sovereign rights in the territory of the Ukraine: the 'moral' authority transformed into the 'legal rule' of the *Rada* on the one side, and on the other the former legitimate authority of the Provisional Government—which was losing ground every day, but which had not completely disappeared.

Under these circumstances several members of the reconstructed cabinet of the Provisional Government hastened to Kiev—Kerenski, Tereshchenko, Nekrasov and Tsereteli. At the time Kerenski was preoccupied with the South-Western Front, where a renewed Russian offensive was to prove to the Allies that the Provisional Government remained faithful to the idea of 'war to a successful end', and it is probable that the *Rada* had chosen this conjunction of [721]

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circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed 668
liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the 642
South-Western Army.

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 721
100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization 642
of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized.

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak 669
of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection.

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements 642
it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 669
'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons.

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both 642
troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the 634
German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine.

When the delegates returned to Kiev there was a regular storm of indignation in the *Rada*. Hrushevsky, however, was receding into the background, and most of the decisions of the *Rada* were now inspired by Vinnichenko. It was he who insisted on acquiescence in the 'instructions' of the Provisional Government. 'The right to possess something', he explained to his disgruntled followers, 'is not given on bits of paper; it is the result of the balance of the forces in conflict, which balance can always change in different circumstances. Let us take what is given to us and let us go on. After all, this is not a peace but an armistice.'(3)

'The different circumstances' which instilled caution into Vinnichenko developed with alarming rapidity. In August, Kerenski, quailing before the spectre of 'counter-revolution', applied to the Bolsheviks for help in order 'to safeguard the conquests of the Revolution'. Taking advantage of this fatal move, the Bolsheviks immediately intensified their propaganda throughout the country in favour of the immediate cessation of the war, and they spread the demand that all power should be transferred to the Soviets of Soldiers, Workers and Peasants as the only true defenders of the Revolution. The Bolshevik agitation, fed upon a progressive disintegration of the social order, ran through the cities of the Ukraine, and Vinnichenko could not help realizing that the ephemeral tactical victories of the *Rada* were nothing compared to the devastating victories of the Bolsheviks and of the extreme left wing of the Social Revolutionaries. After bitter experience, he wrote in his daily paper, *Novaya Rada*, that 'national questions at that time did not have the overwhelming importance which the Central *Rada* wished to ascribe to them'. He even went so far as to avow that the *Rada* and its members were hated and laughed at by the population. 'Everything Ukrainian was laughed at: songs, schools, papers, books. The son was cynically and resentfully making fun of his mother.' The former head of the General Secretariat continued: 'We did not have a strong proletariat conscious of its nationality because, in most cases, it had been denationalized and russified in most of the big towns.' As for the peasantry, according to Vinnichenko: 'We found our principal support among the peasants, not among the poor ones, but among the wealthier ones.' This fact, recognized by Vinnichenko, deserves to be noted.

Notwithstanding the blatant defects of the self-appointed 'organ of moral authority' in Kiev, there were some decent elements upholding the Central *Rada*. Among its six hundred members were men who hoped to build something even on the shaky foundations of Ukrainian autonomy. True, as Vinnichenko himself owns: 'We

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spoke of our success at the elections, but let us be honest amongst 668 ourselves and to others: we availed ourselves of the ignorance of the oppressed masses. It was not they who elected us, but we who imposed ourselves on them.' But among these 'self-elected' were men who were acting in the hope of creating a dam against the raging revolutionary sea. Certain elements of sanity and order were to be found in the *Rada*: men who despaired of finding salvation in the weak and passive Provisional Government, and who hoped to achieve something themselves under the Ukrainian flag.

The candid Vinnichenko goes on to mention that the Central *Rada* 'had dreamed of founding its authority on the support of foreign bourgeois states and on the existing social order'. But if there was no real force on the side of the Provisional Government, there was also none on the side of the *Rada*. 'Our Ukrainian soldiers were not content with the gold-and-blue standard and with new red caps. When they saw that the *Rada* was on the side of the propertied classes, they naturally turned to those who offered them more tangible goods—the Bolsheviks. Not Russian but Ukrainian regiments took Kiev later for the Bolsheviks.'

In August and September 1917, under the growing pressure of Bolshevism, those political tendencies in the *Rada* which were represented by Hrushevsky and his group lost ground seriously. Hrushevsky and his followers had remained true to their 'Austrian orientation' which by 1917 had become an 'Austro-German orientation'. These defeatists in relation to Russia had been counting on Austro-German support because they were aware that the Ukrainian separatist movement could facilitate the attainment of the objectives of the Austro-German Command. But even in defeatism the *Rada* could not compete with the Bolsheviks, for the modest defeatism of the separatists was of little value to the Germans compared with the really gigantic defeatism of the Soviets, which were now entirely in the hands of Lenin and his adherents. The Bolsheviks had worked so successfully for the disintegration of the Front that Riga had now fallen to the Germans and the way lay open to Petrograd. The Germans were already within reach of their objective of a separate peace with Russia, and while the Soviets could answer for the whole of the Russian Front the romantics of the *Rada*—who could not even control the mutinous mobs in the Ukrainian cities—must continue to fail to inspire the interest of the German General Staff.[4]

In September, as the fatal autumn of 1917 approached, Kiev was preoccupied with almost academic activities. Surrounded by a certain amount of pomp, a Congress representing all the nationalities

668 of the Russian Empire was holding its sessions. About a hundred delegates representing thirteen nationalities and twelve Cossack lands were in attendance, and another six nationalities which had not sent delegates declared their 'adherence to the decisions of the Congress' without taking part in it. The decisions consisted of a plan for converting the structure of the Empire into a federation of autonomous states which were to have common internal and foreign policies. Apparently the Ukrainians were not entirely pleased with the moderate claims of the Congress, and delegates of the *Rada* proceeded to Petrograd to demand that all authority in the Ukraine should be exercised exclusively by the *Rada* and its General Secretariat. They also required the recognition of the right of all nationalities within the Empire to dispose of their own destinies and called for the meeting of a 'Sovereign National Constituent Assembly'. While still waiting in Petrograd for the satisfaction of their demands, the delegates had the exciting experience of being present at the taking of the Winter Palace by the Bolsheviks.

The October Revolution (November by the New Style) did not produce an armed struggle in Kiev as in Petrograd and Moscow. In Kiev Bolshevik elements were neither numerous nor strong: there were no important industrial plants in the ancient city by the Dniepr, and the few thousand proletarians were scattered round the arsenal and the railway workshops. The *Rada* could also rely on a certain number of obedient troops. The downfall of the Provisional Government did not result in the transfer in the Ukraine of its somewhat shadowy authority to the Soviets; such authority as there was remained in the hands of the *Rada*. This fact was underlined in the third 'Universal' published by the *Rada*. It was affirmed that the *Rada* would continue as the organ of power until the convocation of 'the Ukrainian National Constituent Assembly', freely elected, which would form a Government for the whole territory of the Ukrainian Republic. The *Rada* also confirmed its readiness 'to help Russia to become a Federative State of Free and Equal Nations'.

This 'Universal', published on 7–20 November, was regarded as a declaration of war by the newly established Soviet power. There was little chance for the Central *Rada* to emerge victorious from any armed conflict. In November 1917 the authority of the *Rada* only covered the agricultural districts adjacent to Kiev on both banks of the Dniepr. At the Front soldiers' Soviets ruled supreme, and in Kharkov and the big industrial towns of New Russia the Bolsheviks were gaining ground. Scarcely a month had elapsed before the authority of the *Rada* was overthrown in Kharkov, where on 27 December the Bolsheviks proclaimed a 'Provisional Ukrainian

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668 Soviet Government'. A few days later Red troops took possession of Ekaterinoslav; by the first half of January Mariupol, Odessa and Nikolaev were in Bolshevik hands, and Red detachments were marching from Kharkov through Poltava on Kiev. Foreign intervention remained the only chance for the Government of the Central *Rada*.

668 728 Although the third 'Universal' had not definitely proclaimed the Ukraine to be an independent republic, the Kiev Government informed the Austro-Hungarian and German authorities of their wish to participate in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations as an independent state.

At Brest-Litovsk all parties were in a hurry. Lenin was anxious to conclude a peace at any price and as rapidly as possible in order to fulfil the promises he had made to the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Delegates; the Germans were concerned to accelerate the liquidation of the Russian Front in order to be able to transfer greater numbers of troops to the Western Front; and they, and more urgently the Austrians, were in desperate need of the supplies which they considered the conclusion of peace would make available to them in Russia. Now the Ukrainians appeared upon the scene in no less haste to secure the salvation of the Kiev Government before it should have been liquidated by the forces of the Russian Revolution.

Representatives of the new Soviet power had crossed the German lines on 27 November, but an armistice had not been signed until 16 December; two days later the Armistice of Focşani had concluded the fighting on the Roumanian Front immediately adjacent to the Ukrainian lands. During the negotiations for an armistice the *Rada* Government had been virtually ignored, for the Bolshevik delegates had been at pains to persuade the Germans that the Ukrainian Republic was nothing more than a fiction which would be swept away by 'the workers and peasants'. But when the news reached Kiev and it became known that negotiations for the signature of a general peace would immediately begin, the *Rada* hastened to declare its wish to participate and, as a reinforcement to its request made by wire, sent emissaries to Vienna in order to take advantage of the old and long-standing connections between the Austrian Government and the Ukrainian separatists.

Peace negotiations started on 8 January 1918 in Brest-Litovsk; Trotsky was at the head of the Soviet Delegation; von Kühlmann and General Hoffmann were the German representatives; and Count Czernin was in charge of Austro-Hungarian interests. Ottoman and Bulgarian Delegations also attended.

Without any special invitation, three young men soon put in their

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appearance—'the three students' they were nicknamed by the representatives of the Russian Revolution and of the two Germanic Empires. Levitsky, Lubinsky and Sevryuk, who declared their wish to take part in the proceedings as the representatives of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', were three of old Hrushevsky's pupils who had hardly had time to finish their schooling.

The aspect of the delegates with whom the representatives of the two great Empires had to treat had ceased to astonish anyone in Brest-Litovsk. Compared to the 'Delegates of the Sailors, Soldiers, Workers and Peasants' with whom General Hoffmann and Prince Leopold of Bavaria had been obliged to sit at the same table during the discussions about the armistice, these 'three students' seemed quite ordinary decent young men. They were invited to lunch and dine with the Delegations of 'the bourgeois states'—an amenity which Trotsky forbade to his Soviet comrades.

Count Czernin, although a little 'shocked' by the youth of the Ukrainian delegates, was obliged by the force of circumstances to enter into friendly relations with them. As for the German delegates, they were frankly pleased with the presence of the representatives of the *Rada*, considering that it might make Trotsky more amenable.

Trotsky continued to deny the existence of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic'. Levitsky and his colleagues produced documents which showed that during the last elections in the Ukraine (November 1917) the *Rada* had polled 75 per cent of the votes and the Bolsheviks only 10 per cent. It was difficult to realize in Brest-Litovsk that those were the elections about which Vinnichenko wrote 'it was not they who elected us, but we who imposed ourselves on them'.

Owing to the importance of the negotiations, there also arrived in the wake of 'the three students', the new Prime Minister of the Ukraine, Vsevolod Holubovich, also quite a young man (thirty-four years of age), a sincere enthusiast of the 'Ukrainian national cause'. During the session of 10 January the presence of the Ukrainians at the Conference was officially recognized and Trotsky, 'with a sore heart', had to give his consent to their participation in the discussions.

The Ukrainian delegates soon began to astonish Hoffmann and Czernin by their immoderate demands. They had instructions to exact the annexation to the 'Popular Republic' not only of the Kholm district, which had been allocated to the proposed new Polish state, but also of Galicia and Bukovina which formed parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hoffmann almost yelled at Lubinsky and Sevryuk, who were not much abashed and declared that they would ask for new instructions from Kiev: they felt a certain amount of strength to be on their side. A few days later Count Czernin

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wrote in his diary: 'The Ukrainians no longer lead the negotiations: they dictate their conditions.' 668 728

The situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire had become critical about 15 January. 'The people are suffering from hunger', pleaded the Archbishop of Cracow; 'bread rations have been cut down by half', wired the Governor of Trieste; 'there is flour in Vienna only till next Monday', came from the Burgomaster of the capital. On the 17th the Emperor Charles wired to Czernin: 'The fate of the monarchy and of the dynasty depends on how soon you will be able to conclude peace in Brest-Litovsk....If peace is not concluded a revolution will break out here.'

It was Czernin's good fortune that at this juncture the Ukrainian delegation received news which obliged it to adopt a less extravagant attitude. The 'Popular Republic' had lost in the first weeks of January all New Russia and nearly all left-bank Ukraine. Trotsky smiled sarcastically when he met 'the three students' and Radek wrote in the Soviet press: 'Let those who want bread scream death to the *Rada*!' Radek's aimable outburst against the Kiev *Rada* indicated that Ukrainian supplies were as badly needed in the Soviet capitals as they were in Vienna. This aspect of affairs was duly appreciated by the Germans, and Hoffmann suddenly became more interested in making peace with the *Rada*. When the Kiev *Rada*, under pressure of a Soviet threat to Kiev, relinquished their claims to Galicia and Bukovina, Hoffmann persuaded Czernin to accept the other conditions, including the demand for Kholm.

On 18 January the negotiations were temporarily interrupted. The Delegations left in quest of fresh instructions from their respective Governments. When after a few days they returned to Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky brought along with him new visitors: the representatives of the 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' which had chosen Kharkov for its capital. Trotsky warned von Kühlmann and Czernin that the 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' 'did not recognize any agreements which might be entered into by the *Rada*'.

The German and Austro-Hungarian Delegations came to the decision not to pay any attention to Trotsky's manœuvre. Hoffmann calmly noted in his diary: 'At any time we could support the Ukrainian Government and establish it again.'

On 1 February dissensions were renewed in Brest-Litovsk in a somewhat chaotic atmosphere. The Germans and Austrians had to carry on discussions with three Delegations at the same time: those of the Soviet Government, of the Ukrainian *Rada* and of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. The *Rada* Delegation produced the fourth 'Universal' from Kiev, according to which on 22 January the

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existence of 'a free and sovereign Ukraine' had been proclaimed. The Government of this new independent state had instructed its delegates to conclude peace 'without paying attention to any obstacles which might arise from other parts of the former Russian Empire'.

In the meantime, on 30 January, 'Red bands' commanded by Muraviëv had approached Kiev and had begun to bombard the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. During the session of 1 February Trotsky could not resist the pleasure of reading out a telegram which announced that some of the Ukrainian regiments of the *Rada* had gone over to the Bolsheviks, and which claimed that the days of the *Rada* were numbered. The Ukrainian delegates, Sevryuk and Lubinsky, responded with sharp denunciations of the Bolsheviks. 'Lubinsky retorted with an hour-long speech which for pure vitriolic opprobrium far exceeded anything that had been heard at this strangest of peace conferences' (Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, p. 210).

But Trotsky's triumph partook only of the theatre, for at the end of this same sitting Count Czernin announced the recognition by the Allied Empires of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' 'as an independent free and sovereign state'.

After this there remained only the technical side of the agreement with the Ukrainians. If Czernin and Kühlmann waited a few days longer it was only in the hope that the threat of a separate peace with the *Rada* might oblige Trotsky to come to his senses. On 8 February the principal clauses of a treaty were established. The basic condition was an obligation on the Ukraine to furnish not less than a million tons of supplies to the Allied Empires. To ensure the fulfilment of this condition an Austro-German Commission was to proceed to Kiev. But it had not been quite in vain that Trotsky had gloomily affirmed during these days that Czernin and Kühlmann were making an agreement with 'legally non-existent persons'. The battle for Kiev was taking place now in Kiev itself. After having signed peace with the Ukraine, Count Czernin wrote in his diary: 'I wonder if the *Rada* is still sitting in Kiev!'

On 10 February Trotsky made his famous declaration, 'Neither peace nor war', which caused Hoffmann to exclaim 'Unerhört!' The Soviet Delegation left Brest-Litovsk the same day. The only tangible result of all the negotiations had been the peace signed with the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic'. But Kiev had now been occupied by the Red Army; the *Rada* had fled to Zhitomir and was getting ready to flee farther west. The small detachments which had remained true to the *Rada* and which had been organized by Simon

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Petlyura (who had constituted himself a specialist in military affairs) 668
were resisting fairly well in northern Podolia, but were certainly un- 728
able to secure the return of the *Rada* to Kiev. Trotsky's dramatic
gesture had, however, simplified the problem. On 17 February the 721
German Government denounced the armistice and ordered the
armies of the Eastern Front to begin their advance. It was the only
way of breaking the stubbornness of the Bolsheviks and of saving the
Rada and the peace which it had signed with the promise of a million
tons of supplies. (4, 5)

§3. THE GERMANS IN THE UKRAINE: HETMAN SKOROPADSKY

On 18 February, the German troops, without meeting any resistance, occupied Dvinsk on the road to Petrograd and Lutsk on the road to Kiev.

But it was no easy matter for the Austrians to resume the offensive. The Austro-Hungarian armies had been broken during the first two years of the war in the great battles with the Russians; in 1917 it had only been with German aid that they had succeeded in throwing back the Italians. No danger from without threatened the Habsburg Monarchy, but within the Empire dangers were growing with each day that passed. Hence on 17 February the Vienna Government had informed Berlin that Austro-Hungarian troops would take no part in the renewal of the war on the Eastern Front.

In the meantime, the Poles and Bohemians were in a state of agitation on account of the cession of the Kholm region to the Ukrainians. When the twenty-nine year old 'student' Sevryuk, who had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Czernin and Kühlmann, made his appearance during a session of the Reichsrath on 19 February, Polish and Bohemian deputies met him with hoots and shouts of 'Clear out of here!' The Austro-Hungarian Government was compelled to put forward 'new conditions' in respect of Kholm.

The German troops continued their march through Volhynia in the direction of Kiev, and the Emperor Charles, fearful that the Austrians might fail to secure their share of the promised Ukrainian supplies, changed his mind. On 24 February the Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Eastern Front received the order to advance into the Ukraine. The Austrian decision had, however, already come too late, for on 1 March Kiev was occupied by the Germans and they alone reinstated the *Rada*.

By 3 March the rapid attainment by the Germans of the line 642
Narva-Pskov and their seizure of the districts of Vitebsk, Mohilev 728

645 the principal persons in this Government by the correspondence which passed between the Austrian and German authorities and their Governments—a part of which subsequently fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks and has been published by them (*The Crash of the German Occupation in Ukraine*, 1936, inf. p. 335). In his reports to Vienna the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Waldstetter, found Vsevolod Holubovich, the President of the Council of Ministers, 'eloquent, imaginative—a man of theories with no character at all; put there by the Germans'. Lubinsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was 'a beardless young man extremely well read in Socialist and revolutionary literature; entirely in the hands of the Germans'. Zhukovski, the Minister for War, 'seems to me pro-Russian; he is an ex-Colonel of the General Staff and tries hard to appear before his colleagues as an untainted Socialist and revolutionary from head to foot; in reality a German puppet'. The same source gives a curious characterization of Hrushevsky. 'Hrushevsky—President of the *Rada*, a frightened old man all of a tremble; his old bones are supposed to give the *Rada* a noble patina worthy of so august an assembly. Holds on for all he is worth to the German Command and shows no sympathy at all towards Austria.' Hrushevsky had certainly changed with the times.

646 The *Rada* was composed of several hundred deputies, belonging to different Ukrainian parties; amongst them were National Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and Social Federalists. Separatist tendencies prevailed, but among the more definitely Socialist groups it was possible to observe a more or less veiled distrust of and hostility towards the Austro-German authorities and the obedient cabinet which they had installed in Kiev. The more prominent representatives of these sentiments included Vinnichenko and Petlyura.

668 After its return to Kiev the *Rada* embarked on the purely academic task of elaborating a constitution for the Ukraine. The Occupation authorities were not much interested in this 'august assembly' and had 'no illusions about its importance'. General Hoffmann wrote at the time: 'The difficulty in the Ukraine is that the Central *Rada* has only our rifles behind it. The moment we withdraw our troops their authority will collapse at once' (Hoffmann, p. 207). The historian of the Brest-Litovsk peace, who has studied the documents of the period with great thoroughness, comes to the conclusion that: 'The separatist movement had no roots in the country and the people as a whole were completely indifferent to national self-determination; this had been thrust upon them by a group of political dreamers whose power was derived from the presence of German bayonets.'

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727 the Germans put obstacles in his way when the question came to arresting Bolsheviks well known for their activities and even demanded that he should set at liberty those who were under arrest.'

The assassination of Field-Marshal Eichhorn by a Ukrainian terrorist on 30 July failed to sting the Germans into modifying the cautious and even conciliatory policy which they had adopted towards the Soviets. At the same time the Field-Marshal's successor, General Kirchbach, lacked his personal influence and had not the prestige necessary to counter the doubtful intrigues of Baron Mumm. The latter continued to have relations (directly or through the German Consulate) with the representatives of the *Rada*. 'He insisted that the Hetman's Government should set at liberty Simon Petlyura and other politicians who had been arrested.(7)

727 ● 668 Intently watching and stimulating the growing unpopularity of the Hetman among the peasantry, the representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist parties organized themselves in the 'National Union', to the head of which Vinnichenko was elected. When this had been done, the Union, acting through the German authorities, began to try to secure the admission of some of their members to participation in the Government. Baron Mumm evidently very much doubted the solidity of Skoropadsky's position. At last the German Foreign Office, convinced by his reports, sent Mumm, on 10 October, categorical instructions to support 'the National Ukrainian Movement' and to 'ukrainize' the Government.

727 668 In October, however, it was plainly evident that the Austro-German Occupation could not endure for many weeks. In that month tempestuous national risings broke out in different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy and the ancient Danubian Empire appeared to be on the verge of dissolution. When the news reached the Austro-Hungarian troops in the Ukraine an irresistible movement swept the ranks for immediate return to their own country. The official German source describes how at the beginning of November disorderly crowds of Austrian soldiers in trains and on foot were going west selling their arms and munitions to the local population. 'A regiment consisting of Italians arrested the Commander and Staff of its Army Corps and declared them to be prisoners of war.' The Germans hastily sent the 7th Landwehr (Württemberg) Division to Odessa in order to clear the town of mutinous Austrian soldiers.

But the officers of the German Army of Occupation did not have to wait long to drain their own cup of bitterness. On 9 November came the news by radio that the Emperor William had abdicated; on the next day that Ebert had formed a Government and that the

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soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§ 4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669

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669 1917—April 1921). The 'Petlyurians' also occupy first place for the number of organized pogroms—493, or together with the 'free' *atamans*—852; the Volunteers follow with 233; the Soviets with 106; and the Poles with 32. How far Petlyura himself was guilty in the organization of these pogroms it is difficult to say. Arnold Margolin, himself a Jew, relates that Petlyura was extremely depressed by pogroms, and 'with tears in his eyes implored his men not to commit them'. But to persuade these 'last of the *Haydamaky*' to any moderation was no easy task.

668 669 Petlyura can scarcely be accused of having seriously favoured pogroms as part of a considered policy, since both he and the 'Directoria' were making every effort to attract the favourable attention of the representatives of the victorious Entente powers. Immediately after the Armistice a report had been addressed to Consul Hainnot, which was subsequently forwarded to General d'Anselm in Odessa and to General Berthelot, who was at that time in Jassy. This report was intended to establish the fact that the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' was a quite normal, strictly democratic, and independent state. Although the French did not hesitate to drive away the detachments of the 'Directoria' by force of arms from the vicinity of Odessa, in January 1919 they went so far as to send a representative to Kiev in the person of General Tabouis. The British, at the same time, contented themselves with the despatch to Kiev of a member of the Consular Service. Altogether the impression gained ground in Kiev that the Ukraine had been reserved as a zone of French interest, while the British were more concerned with the Caucasian area and with the Volunteer Army.

The 'Directoria' viewed the question of its representation at the Paris Peace Conference as a matter of particular importance. A Delegation was hastily formed which included the 'Western Ukrainians' of Galicia with the engineer Sidorenko at their head; the 'Directoria' was represented by their 'Foreign Minister', A. Shulgin; and the numerous Jewish population of the Ukraine had a spokesman in Arnold Margolin. This Delegation, together with others of Governments which had been formed or which had tried to form themselves out of different parts of the Russian Empire, had not been invited to Paris by anyone and was recognized by no one. The Secretary of the Ukrainian Delegation, I. Borshak, summarizing the results of the work done between January and March 1919, reported to the 'Directoria': 'All asked us for information about the Ukrainian Question, but none gave any positive answer. No one promised to recognize our independence. The usual answer was: "Wait till the Conference discusses the Russian

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Question!" There was talk on general topics—the territory, the numbers of the population, our relation with the Bolsheviks and General Denikin. Official French circles were against the Ukraine. Other states, the U.S.A., England and Japan, were on their guard and were only interested in the means at our disposal for struggling against the Bolsheviks' (I. Borshak, *Ukraine at the Peace Conference*).

The French were mainly concerned for the interest of Poland and the 'Directoria' undoubtedly made a serious tactical mistake when they involved the fate of Galicia with that of the Russian Ukraine. Furthermore, so soon after the recent hard struggle with Germany, the representatives of the Allies were not inclined to regard with favour envoys from the *de facto* succession states of the Russian Empire the Governments of which had owed their origin to German diplomacy and German bayonets.

Another member of the Ukrainian Delegation, Arnold Margolin, complains of 'the influence of Russians' who, from the monarchist groups to radical leaders like Kerenski, Avksentiev and Chaykovski, were all united in the belief that Russia 'one and indivisible' would be resuscitated. Margolin proposed that all 'the oppressed nationalities of the former Empire—not only Ukrainians, but also Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, the Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban, the Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus and the White Russians adjoining the Polish provinces—should be invited to the Conference'. But when Margolin obtained an interview with Lansing, the latter told him frankly that 'he knew only one Russia which might perhaps become a federative state after she had got rid of the Bolsheviks'. Margolin betook himself to England, but there he found that people were only interested in the successes of the 'White' Armies of Denikin and Kolchak and believed in their ultimate victory. After having failed to raise interest in the fate of the 'oppressed nationalities' of the Russian Empire, Margolin broached the question of the fate of the Jews, but here too he found that people were not interested. In 1919 it was well remembered that the Jewish population of Poland and the Ukraine had been on the side of the Germans and that German Jews had taken upon themselves the role of intermediaries between the German High Command and the Bolsheviks.

The only practical result of the 'diplomatic relations' between France and the 'Directoria' was a categorical demand on the part of the French that Vinnichenko and another minister, Shakhovsky, should retire—because they were suspected of 'Bolshevism'.

The representatives of the Entente powers appear to have made every effort to unite all the forces which were struggling against

648 the Soviets, but they had no easy task. The Volunteer Army re-
668 garded the 'Petlyurians' with scarcely less distaste than it did the Bolsheviks, while the 'Directoria' considered the 'White' movement to be monarchical and reactionary, and the Ukrainian nationalists aimed at separation rather than at federalism. The relation between the Volunteer Army and the Poles was outwardly correct, but each grudged the other success in their 'common struggle' against the Soviets. The Russians were nervous about the Polish campaign in White Russia and Volhynia; the Poles feared the resurrection of a great Russia. The Poles went so far as to hold their advance against the Red Army when this advance could have dealt a decisive blow to the Soviets at the moment of Denikin's greatest success. These dissensions, which were natural enough, in the end allowed the Bolsheviks to extricate themselves from a position which, as Trotsky relates in his memoirs, Lenin at that time regarded as hopeless.

669 In July the Volunteer Army occupied Ekaterinoslav; then Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa; and on the 3rd Kharkov had been taken after some fighting. Regardless of General Wrangel's proposal to halt on the line Tsaritsyn-Ekaterinoslav and to put some order into the disorganized rear, Denikin pressed the advance in a northerly direction towards Moscow and westward on Kiev. As a result his none too numerous forces were widely scattered over an enormous territory.

669 At the same time Petlyura had begun his advance on Kiev from
648 the west, and this circumstance was one of the reasons for the false
648 manoeuvre undertaken by the Volunteer Army. In the end the
Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' came up to Kiev at the same time, and the ancient city was taken on 1 September, from the east by the 'Whites' and from the south by the Ukrainians. No good could be expected to result from this simultaneous but separate occupation of Kiev by the rival armies. *Pourparlers* did not result in an agreement. It only became clear that the Galicians were ready to come to an understanding with the 'Whites', but the 'Directoria' was jealous, and stubborn. Petlyura demanded complete independence and vast territories. In his blind hate of 'the Russian monarchists and reactionaries' he secretly appealed for help to the Poles. When in the second half of September armed conflicts between the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' broke out and the latter were driven out of Kiev towards the west, rumours of Petlyura's negotiations with the Poles set the Galician regiments against him. On 7 November the Galicians, tired of the lack of discipline and inefficiency rife among the 'Petlyurians', decided to desert their leader and to go over to the

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731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy
563 inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard
669 to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of
642 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

● 668 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in
656 Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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who had been associated with the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'. Both 668 parties had their reasons for conciliation. So far as the Soviet 656 authorities were concerned the appearance of prominent non-Bolsheviks in the administration enabled them to improve their relations with the peasantry and to convince them that Lenin's New Economic Policy was indeed, in his own words, 'in earnest and for long'. It does not follow that the peasants had ever been particularly enthusiastic for the nationalist ideology of the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'; but the Ukrainian nationalist leaders, owing to their social origins, were nearer to the peasantry than the men at the head of the various Committees of the Communist Party and the Soviet administration. The latter were either 'new-comers' from the north or representatives of the local Jewish 'intelligentsia' or men drawn from the 'proletariat' of industrial centres. They owed their rise generally to their revolutionary services in the streets of the great cities. The former collaborators of Vinnichenko and Petlyura, on the other hand, were either peasants by origin or they belonged to the typically Ukrainian 'half-intelligentsia' of the countryside.

In encouraging these men to work with the Communist Party, the Soviet authorities did not contemplate allowing them to play a part in the political life of the country, and in this respect they kept them under the strictest control. On the other hand, they were allowed wide scope in the field of 'cultural work', because the Bolsheviks understood that these people would interpret 'cultural work' in the form of hasty 'ukrainization' which in its tendency to supplant the remnants of 'the imperial culture' in the Ukraine would serve purposes which the Bolsheviks themselves had in view. 'Ukrainization' was, in the view of the Bolsheviks, a harmless occupation for the active intellectual element in the Ukraine during a difficult period of transition—an occupation which at the same time would tend to tone down past bitterness and to divert renewing energies into a comparatively harmless channel. In Caucasia, where the Bolsheviks had to do with tougher men among whom the national idea had deeper roots, they were to find that within ten years the same policy was to produce formidable difficulties.

The first to set the example of going over to the Soviets was none [557] other than the patriarch of the Ukrainian movement himself, Professor Hrushevsky, who was rewarded with the Presidency of the newly founded Ukrainian Academy in Kiev. Hrushevsky was followed by the former President of the Council of Ministers of the *Rada* Government, Holubovich, by the General Secretary to the *Rada*, Khrystyuk, and a number of other prominent radicals and separatists.

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against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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474 *kolkhozy* covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for
661 instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government
423 of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

474 As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked
661 open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed
revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of
423 guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determina-
● 662 tion and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the 474
Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian 661
peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their 423
women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and
more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, 668
held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization 731
in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, 166
and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the 661
enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and
most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign corre- 131
spondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

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appointed as First Counsellor in the four capitals (Vienna was included) where the Ukrainians had had independent representation. This arrangement continued until 1925, when such appointments began to be considered only as 'desirable'. Ukrainian Communists soon vanished from important positions in the Soviet embassies and legations, and for the last thirteen years the Ukrainian S.S.R. has had not even the shadow of formal representation abroad. 648

(13) *The Ukrainians in Poland*

The Paris Conference, in 1919, only recognized the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia pending a solution of 'the Russian Question'. The Polish position in Galicia was finally affirmed by the Council of the League of Nations (15 March 1923), but the Polish Government undertook to establish a 'gradual' autonomy for the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia. 563 668 ●

The Ukrainians claimed that not less than three and a half millions of the population of Eastern Galicia were of Ukrainian stock, and they reckoned another three millions in Western Galicia, the Kholm region, and the Polish districts of Polesia and Volhynia.

The Polish census of 1939 admitted only 1,600,000 Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, while the population of Russian origin in other regions of Poland was not allowed to be even in part Ukrainian. This great disparity in estimates can be explained by the fact that the Poles described as 'Russians' all those elements, formerly 'pro-Muscovite', who were lukewarm in their support of the separatist version of the Ukrainian national movement.

- The Polish Government had some success in detaching from the Ukrainian nationalists a section of the rural population who were flattered by the discovery that they were in fact 'russified Polish *szlachta*'. It was affirmed that during the preceding two centuries many families of the lesser Polish nobility had become so impoverished that they had disappeared into the mass of the peasantry and had become the victims of systematic methods of russification. The movement of the so-called 'Szlachta Zagrodowa' (Smallholder Gentry) had great success, and the journal of the association, *Pobudki*, claimed recently that the number of 'russified *szlachta*' who were expected 'to return to the bosom of their mother Poland' amounted to 700,000 persons. Thus, if those who desired to remain Russian and those who desired to become Poles (together with real Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans) are deducted from the Ukrainian estimate, it will be found that the total number of *conscious* Ukrainians in all Galicia did not exceed two millions.

These two millions remain, however, an important factor in the Galician borderland where Polish, German, Russian, Roumanian and Hungarian interests are in dangerous conflict, and the energetic activities of Ukrainian groups and political parties continued to exercise a disturbing influence on the life of the Polish State during the whole period 1919–39.

The most important Ukrainian party is U.N.D.O. (The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*Obyedinenie*)), which rose to importance about 1925 under the leadership of Dmitro Levitsky. The party could claim a membership of [illegible] one million, and it published a series of papers of which *Diilo* (Action) in Lvov was the most important. The ultimate aim of

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U.N.D.O. was a united and independent Ukraine; but working within the structure of the Polish State the party refrained from advocating 'separatism at home' and claimed independence only for 'enslaved' Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet Government regarded U.N.D.O. as the most dangerous, because the most serious, of all Ukrainian political groups.

Relations between the Polish Government and U.N.D.O. were far from cordial during the years 1925–30. Both sides, however, were seeking compromise and the U.N.D.O. leaders, though they failed to acquire legalized autonomy, appeared temporarily satisfied with the position of *de facto* autonomy which they had attained through their social, educational and co-operative organizations (*Selsky Hospodar* (The Country Farmer), *Dnistr*, *Maslosoyuz* (Butter League), etc.). The policy of 'peace with Poland' was supported by the Ukrainian Catholic and Uniate organizations under the leadership of the Uniate Metropolitan, Count Szepticki with the periodicals, *Meta* (Aim), *Nedilya* (Week). On the other hand, certain fractions of U.N.D.O. maintained a hostile attitude towards the Polish Government, voiced in the papers *Nash Prapor* (Our Standard), *Nash Klych* (Our Warcry). Communist influences were noticeable in the propaganda of these fractions.

Abroad the U.N.D.O. was on the best of terms with the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic. Antagonism to Poland had become a tradition in Prague since 1920, when the passage of arms to Poland during the war with the Soviets had been refused. Ukrainian refugees, from both Soviet Ukraine and Galicia, were sure of a kindly reception in the Czech capital, which between the years 1925–35 became, if not the Ukrainian political centre, at least the cultural and educational focus where the idea of a Greater Ukraine, independent and sovereign, was openly preached in the high schools (in many of which special Ukrainian courses were available for students).

The intense interest shown by the leaders of the Third Reich in the Ukrainian problem—an interest which provoked the series of trials, banishments and executions in Soviet Ukraine—aroused the anxiety of the Polish Government. By no means confident of the loyalty of the population of Eastern Galicia, Kholm, and Volhynia, the Poles decided to accelerate the 'polonization' of these regions. This 'polonizing' process took unfortunate and sometimes arbitrary and violent forms: prohibition in some districts of the use of the Ukrainian or Russian languages, and the revival of the old struggle against the Orthodox and even against the Uniate Churches. A great number of Orthodox and Uniate churches were closed or 'turned back' into Catholic ones.

It would have been difficult to discover methods more likely to revive the age-old historic struggle 'for land and faith' between Poles and Ukrainians. A hatred of 'the Polish orientation' was quickly roused among the Ukrainian peasantry, and the moderate sections of U.N.D.O. with their policy of compromise began to lose ground. The U.N.D.O. party organization was forced to denounce the basis of conciliation reached in 1930 and confirmed in 1935. At the moment of the German attack on Poland, U.N.D.O. announced its loyalty to the Polish state, but the foundations of this loyalty had been sapped by the mistakes of the Polish politicians. It was Stalin, not Hitler, who reaped the benefit.

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From time to time the struggle between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia 563
took an acute form and was accompanied by industrial strikes, peasant riots
and acts of terrorism against the administration. These methods, violent and 668
illegal, were not approved by U.N.D.O., but they were stimulated both by secret Communist organizations and by the unofficial Ukrainian Party which called itself the Ukrainian National Union (U.N.U.). U.N.U. repudiated all compromise with Poland, and proclaimed an armed struggle against her. Comparable in its organization and tactics to the I.R.A. (on which it was probably modelled to carry on a struggle in geographical and social conditions in some ways similar to those of Ireland), the U.N.U. organized a network of secret militarized groups all over Galicia. Galicia was looked on as a territory where the 'Army Corps' of U.N.U. was 'quartered': the territory was divided into four districts corresponding to 'Divisions', which were further divided into 'Regiments', 'Battalions' and 'Companies'. Some scores of thousands of men, young for the most part, and fanatically devoted to 'the cause', joined U.N.U.

At the head of the movement stood the bold and adventurous figure of Colonel Konovalets. A former officer of the Austrian Army, Konovalets had led the troops of the 'Directoria' which drove Skoropadsky from Kiev in December 1918. Later he had quarrelled with Petlyura on account of the latter's 'Polish orientation'.

Already in the twenties Konovalets had sought favour and aid in Germany. He was not the only one: about 1924 a certain Poltavets-Ostranitsa, who called himself 'Hetman', appeared in Munich with the same object. Konovalets, however, was much more successful than his rivals, and, towards 1930, he established firm relations with German political and military circles, and at the same time made really effective the secret organization of U.N.U. in Galicia. A newspaper of U.N.U., *Ukrainske Slovo* (Ukrainian Word) was published in Paris; other publications appeared in Germany.

The keen interest with which the Nazi leaders regarded the Ukrainian problem lent a serious meaning to the conspiratorial activities of Colonel Konovalets, who was not ashamed to express openly his 'German orientation'. In 1933 negotiations were set on foot between U.N.U. and representatives of the Nazi Party concerning 'preparatory measures' which were to be taken for the creation of a future 'Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian State'. The German negotiators were principally interested in the organization of a potential 'Ukrainian Government'. The lack of suitable candidates for political office among his own supporters led Konovalets to make contact with the remnants of Petlyura's followers, among whom several 'ex-cabinet ministers' were to be found. There was a project to open relations with Ukrainian nationalists who had remained in Soviet Ukraine, and Konovalets was also in touch with the former Hetman Skoropadsky, who was living at Wannsee near Berlin. Konovalets obviously aimed at organizing a 'united Ukrainian front', and the Ukrainians undoubtedly lost one who might have proved a resolute national leader, when the colonel was killed in a café in Rotterdam by the explosion of a bomb in the form of a cigarette-box which was handed to him by a man presumed to have been a Soviet agent.

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For U.N.U. the death of Konovalets was an even greater blow than it first appeared. Deprived of leadership, the organization began to go to pieces. The Polish police succeeded in arresting numbers of leaders of the regional organizations, and the movement's German supporters began to lose confidence in the conspiratorial method.

Both the moderate and the extremist Ukrainian political parties in Poland, the U.N.D.O. and the U.N.U., were born in Galicia in the atmosphere of the local political struggle. Distinct from these parties were the representatives of the erstwhile Ukrainian Popular Republic who had settled in Poland. This group continued to consider itself as the 'legal government' of Russian Ukraine with Andrew Levitsky as 'president' and several 'cabinet ministers' and 'diplomatic representatives' in different countries (Mazeppa, Prokopovich, A. Shulgin, General Salsky and others). Part of these 'Petlyurians' lived in Poland, others in Prague and Paris, where they published their periodical *Trizub* (Trident, the emblem on Vladimir's coins). Contrasting in this respect with the Galician political parties, which did not put their social programme in the first place, these former adherents of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', faithful to the traditions of the *Rada* and *Directoria*, had retained their socialist tendencies but in a very moderate form.

It is a curious fact that this group of 'the Ukrainian Popular Republic' enjoyed until recently not only the support of the Czech Government, with whose ideology it had much in common, but also that of the Polish Government, which at the same time was incapable of establishing normal durable relations with the Galician Ukrainians. The politicians of the U.P.R. kept themselves apart not only from the extremists of the U.N.U. but also from the moderates of the U.N.D.O. They did not of course preach separatism in regard to Poland, and as the years passed they became much more tolerant on the subject of the exact status of the Ukraine in the event of the downfall of the Soviet régime and the revival of a Russian state. Konovalets had tried to enlist them for 'the United Ukrainian front' patronized by the Third Reich, but such an orientation could scarcely attract the 'Petlyurians', penetrated by democratic and even socialist tendencies. Some of them remained faithful to the 'Polish orientation' of Petlyura himself, others struck up friendship with the Parisian group of *La Revue de Prométhée*—a periodical published by the representatives of different nationalities which had formed part of the Russian Empire and are now under Soviet dominion. *Les Prométhéens* are drastically opposed to the Soviet régime, denounce the absence of real autonomy in the Soviet Union and stand ultimately for a 'federal state of nationalities'. The Ukrainians who participate in this movement therefore abandon the idea of 'integral separatism' and profess opinions in the spirit of those expressed once upon a time by Michael Dragomanov.

Former 'Petlyurians' are at present less opposed to the ideas of which Hetman Skoropadsky was the symbol than they were at the time when they began their armed struggle against him. The ex-Hetman has retained a certain influence on Ukrainians and admirers of his title can be met in many parts of the world—in Paris and London, in Canada and the United States. His son Danylo is considered by them as 'the lawful successor' of the now ageing Paul.

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Outside Poland, Ukrainians are to be found in many European and American countries. Political and academic circles of Ukrainian intelligentsia are grouped round periodicals of varying views, but these circles consist of scores, perhaps, of persons out of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian land labourers who have migrated from over-populated Galicia. After the war and revolution thousands of fugitives from the South of Russia and Volhynia joined them. In the Ukrainian press from time to time appear statements that the number of Ukrainians in Western Europe reaches 500,000, in Canada over a million, in the United States about 700,000 and in South America 200,000. These figures are undoubtedly exaggerated. In France the number of refugees from the South of Russia who can be considered 'Ukrainians' did not exceed a few scores of thousands, and the same must be said about Czechoslovakia and Balkan countries. However, among the Polish agricultural workers and miners in France (900,000) a third came from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. And there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands have migrated from Galicia to the United States and especially to Canada where, owing to hard work and a certain capacity for organization, brought over from their native land, many have attained prosperity. America is the land where emigrants from Europe keep together according to their nationality more than anywhere else. The Ukrainian emigration in Canada and the United States has retained a vivid interest in everything pertaining to Ukrainian nationality. It has its own press, publishes its books, teaches its language and history in its schools. The Ukrainians in America consider it their duty to respond to the appeals of the different Ukrainian parties and groups which have remained in Europe. Therefore echoes of all the different tendencies of Ukrainian political life can be found in Canada and the United States: 'pro-Russians' who do not wish to be called 'Ukrainians', adherents of U.N.D.O., followers of Colonel Konovalets, partisans of Petlyura and the 'Petlyurians', admirers of 'the young Hetman' Danylo Skoropadsky. However, purely ideological discussions are not so acute there as among the different 'fractions' in Europe. 'The united Ukrainian front' would have a better chance in emigration, because its basis would not be so much political activity, as a common historical tradition and a common love of the Ukrainian land.

(14) *Literature on the Ukrainian Question* 113

Numerous papers, mostly by well-known Ukrainian writers and political leaders, have appeared in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. These papers have made available to English readers information on various aspects of the Ukrainian Question. The following should be noted:

Vol. v, No. 13, p. 169, Kolessa, A., 'Bibliography of the Ukrainian Language'.
ix, No. 27, p. 367, Paneyko, B., 'Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem'.
Ibid. p. 88, Skorowski, S., 'The Ukrainian Problem in Poland'.
x, No. 28, p. 116, Loś, S., 'Ukrainian Question in Poland'.
Ibid. p. 138, Borshak, E., 'Relations of England and Ukraine.'
xii, No. 35, p. 323, Mazepa, I., 'Ukrainia under Bolshevist Rule' (valuable, based on careful study of the Ukrainian Soviet press).
Ibid. No. 36, p. 622, Doroshenko, D., 'The Uniat Church in Galicia'.

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§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that ‘the social revolution 000
begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.’ Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the 565
years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that 665
the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable 661
adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was 185
therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

‘The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had
been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. 423
The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to 661
a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this 565
case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely 474
ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were [668]
unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their
risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest’ (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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186 563 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a [316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 668 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 565 668 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise, when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

century Mykola Mikhnovsky had issued a call for an independent 186
state and for a while he had exerted a strong influence upon such 565
future Ukrainian leaders as Symon Petlyura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Volodymyr Chekhovsky, but his ideas of placing national liberation in the forefront seemed too extreme for his adherents and by 1917 many of these had in a sense fallen away from his advanced position. 635

On the other hand, two and a half years of war had shown to many of the Ukrainian officers and men in the Russian army the need of a disciplined force to uphold the national cause. Some of the Ukrainian regiments had early joined the forces of the Revolution, had adopted the Ukrainian flag and introduced Ukrainian as the language of command. Now at the Military Congresses which were held in Kiev in 1917, they took a strong stand in their demands that the Ukrainian National Rada adopt a firm policy toward St. Petersburg and the Provisional Government and they were willing to go much further than the Rada in the setting up of independent governmental machinery.

Opposed to this group were the great mass of the peasants. They were little aware of the involved task of governing or even maintaining order. It would be hardly fair to say that they were anarchistic in temperament. They had rather maintained almost unconsciously their Ukrainian character. Few of them had been further from their villages than the nearest administrative centre and they could not see the necessity of substituting another regime on a broad scale for the fallen tsarist system. For decades they had attributed all their hardships and difficulties to the tsar, the bureaucrats and the police, and with all three vanished, they had no desire to replace them. It seemed to them that the land was intended by God for their use, and once the landlords were dispossessed, they were ready to forget the past and live in peace and quiet with their neighbors. Two and a half years of war had taught them the folly of organized destruction and they willingly accepted the position that a new world had come into being in which there was no need for complicated forms of government, for the collection of taxes and the enforced maintenance of order.

186 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given
565 them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to
● 668 have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian
565 intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Demo-
668 cratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent.
665 Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land 186
in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was 565
only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the 668
Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the 665
community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper.

By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

186 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as
565 Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian
668 Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even
665 though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

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ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Ukraine in the Late Thirties

With the power of Moscow thus defined and reasserted by 668
the free vote of the Moscow-controlled Communist representatives of the various independent republics that formed part of the USSR, the way was open for the next step. Stalin had not only prepared himself legally at home by a clever use of contradictory expressions but he had taken advantage of the good will of the liberals and progressives of the rest of the world by exploiting the distrust which they felt for Hitler and the Nazis and had infiltrated Communists through the media of popular fronts into nearly all the governments that boasted of their democracy.

Next came the bewildering series of trials which were now held 661
in Moscow. In quick succession Yagoda, the dreaded head of 687
the NKVD, was removed from his post, arrested and shot by his successor Yezhov, whose name was soon to become even more detested. Then, in a series of three public trials which extended from the end of 1936 to 1938, nearly all of the old Bolshevik leaders who had played important roles in Soviet life during the period of Lenin's domination were condemned for counter-revolutionary activity and either shot or sentenced to long terms of deportation, from which they did not return. The list included such names as Bukharin, the former theoretician of the Party, Zinovyev, the master of the Leningrad Soviet, the leading supporters of Trotsky, Rykov, etc. At the same time Marshal Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Red Army in its unsuccessful drive against Warsaw in 1920, Marshal Yegorov, the leader of the southern wing of that army with which Stalin himself had served as political commissar and most of the other leading officers were removed and

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The Western Ukrainian Reaction

000 To appreciate the next step in the relations between the Western Ukrainians and the Soviets, it is necessary to go back and look briefly at the conditions that existed under Polish rule. The two peoples were distinctly hostile but their relations were very different from those between the Eastern Ukrainians and the Russians.

563 The old Austro-Hungarian Empire, unlike the Russian, had not denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, even though it had not favored their development save as a counterbalance to the Poles in Eastern Galicia. Yet there was a considerable number of Western Ukrainians who had been trained to fill the lower offices in the old Hapsburg system. They had the right of voting for the provincial diets and when the Hapsburg Empire disintegrated, they immediately voted for the establishment of a Western Ukrainian Republic. When this failed to establish itself and to win recognition by the Western powers and the League of Nations, the vast majority of the Western Ukrainians under the leadership of the UNDO voted for representatives to the Polish Parliament and continued the struggle in a legal and parliamentary manner to win rights for themselves.

● 668 A minority which was finally organized into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Col. Evhen Konovalets continued the illegal and revolutionary struggle through sabotage and terroristic attacks on outstanding anti-Ukrainian Poles. It was in vain that the Polish government endeavored to suppress this group by the forced pacification of Eastern Galicia and by other violent tactics and, after the murder of Colonel Konovalets, his place was taken by Colonel Melnyk.

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● 668 In 1932, in connection with the suppression of the Ukrainians in the UkSSR, the claim was advanced that the OUN had commenced work in eastern Ukrainian territory. However that might be, the small group continued to operate in Poland. It trained young men in secret military organizations, in operating without detection, and in undercover political education. In this work it was opposed and imitated by some of the legal political bodies, usually of a more leftist but still anti-Communist type, which likewise prepared their own cadres of semi-trained men who would be ready to act, if need arose.

The events of 1939, with the rise and fall of the independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine, won many adherents to these groups and organizations, and after the outbreak of the war and the occupation of Western Ukraine by the Communists, the latter advertised their existence by their talk of an active Ukrainian underground.

With the first months of the occupation the network of these groups spread throughout the country but even under these conditions there was little or no cooperation between them and similar Polish groups which persisted in maintaining the Polish supremacy and waited only for the Soviet defeat to reassert their hegemony in the area. Some of the leaders went abroad and there was considerable confusion aroused in their ranks but, by the spring of 1940, when the full weight of the Soviet changes was beginning to be felt by the population, the attitude changed toward these groups and they began to be looked upon as the leaders of the Ukrainians who objected to the introduction of the Communist regime.

The general turmoil that existed with anti-Nazis fleeing to the east, the outstanding Ukrainians trying to get to the west, the sending of members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the villages as teachers and the general disorganization, gave them relatively good conditions for developing and making their principles and knowledge available to the villagers. These were made aware of the fact that any opposition to the new regime would be instantly punished and as their normal pre-war life was now converted into a criminal existence, they showed themselves more ready to cooperate. 668

Unfortunately, during this preliminary period discord broke out [578] in the OUN. One faction under Stepan Bandera objected to the leadership of Colonel Melnyk and demanded the change of several prominent leaders. When this was refused, a split came in the organization with Melnyk at the head of one faction and Bandera in control of the other. It is very possible that this split was the result of German intrigue to prevent the formation of a strong Ukrainian movement but it had the result of weakening it, even though both Bandera and Melnyk fell into German hands and were imprisoned during the rest of the war. Their followers continued and intensified the feud and even came to armed clashes.

Both factions of the OUN and similar groups strengthened themselves first along the borders and commenced to smuggle arms and ammunition from the west, so as to be prepared to act in case there came an armed clash between Germany and the USSR. Then, as the months passed, the network extended further into the country and the OUN became organized on a territorial basis under a Country Executive and the Country Leader, who were assisted by expert advisers on military affairs and propaganda.

While the two imperialistic powers were still friends, there was little possibility for open sabotage. The chief work of the Ukrainian patriotic underground was the spreading of the national spirit, the encouraging of the spirits of the oppressed, and the secret education of the masses in the hope of later action. They sought to counterbalance the Soviet propaganda and their efforts to enlist the young people in the Komsomols and train them as Communists. They worked upon some of the eastern Ukrainians who were moved by the Soviet regime to the west and they brought it about that some of these remained behind and joined their ranks when the break finally came in 1941.

Despite the efforts of the leaders to hold their followers in check, they were not always successful for some of the younger members were so enraged by the Bolshevik tactics that they could not be restrained from attempting individual acts of reprisal. These usually failed and involved not only the punishment of numbers of the innocent but also called the attention of the Communist leaders to the existence of the organizations and made them more vigilant in tracking down suspects.

Some of the members, to secure more adequate military training, even enlisted in the Red Army, sometimes with the approval of the heads of the underground but this proved an expensive process, for the alerted Communists usually moved these candidates for training well to the east where they would be harmless in case of a general conflict. Numbers of them were sent to the Bashkir ASSR and to the central Russian areas.

By the spring of 1941 there were many members of these underground associations hiding in the forests of Eastern Galicia and Volynia and the Soviets sent out armed detachments to pursue them and to locate the caches of arms which they had not only smuggled in but had taken from the Poles during the last days of the Polish opposition and which they had seized from small and often unsuspecting Soviet detachments. These searches often resulted in armed clashes in which the Red forces often emerged victorious, thanks to the ever greater numbers of soldiers who were assigned to them.

The work of the courriers between the different units and sections became more arduous and dangerous as the Soviets tightened their control over the population and strengthened the border guards on one pretext or another. What had once been a relatively open border, the area between Sokal and Turka, was now guarded by barbed wire and the Ukrainian population, which was suspected of complicity with the underground, was removed.

In the same way, the Soviets prepared one device after another to attack the Executive of this underground movement. They succeeded three times in capturing and trying many of the leading members and in the spring of 1941 they were starting a fourth trial in which they hoped to assert their power and to crush the movement finally. Yet, their plans for this were finally upset by the opening of hostilities between Germany and the USSR.

It was no easy task to organize this movement under the very eyes of a ruthless invader. Many of the agents who were engaged in it fell into the enemy hands and were executed ruthlessly. It was still harder to bring together the groups that were working for the various Ukrainian parties and to arouse them to a realization that, in the face of the threat from the east, those differences which had seemed so important during the parliamentary struggle against the Poles were to be forgotten in the face of the common danger to all those things which the various parties had in common. Yet they persevered despite heavy losses and by the spring of 1941, while their position still seemed hopeless, they had succeeded in creating a nucleus of organized opposition to Soviet rule which was really widespread and had some repercussions in the ranks of the Red Army, especially among the eastern Ukrainians and some of the other non-Russians who had been mobilized and sent for service in the area.

648 the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic
631 reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper
• [668] or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a
563 secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

727 Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the
661 title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors
[241] merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing
Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych,
[466] who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

● 668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba–Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian
725 forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

menacing their lines of communication and rescuing young Ukrainians 668 who were being deported for labor service in Germany. It 725 was during this year that the leaders came to feel the need for closer cooperation and a unification of their efforts. This was hard to achieve and there were even clashes between different groups of Ukrainian patriots. Yet, toward the beginning of 1943 the more important groups had effected a rough union in the U. P. A., the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which took on the characteristics of an organized military force.

By the middle of 1943 this army had acquired considerable strength and it was able to deal shattering blows to isolated German detachments and to drive out both the local German administration and any Red partisans that tried to operate in the area around the Pripet marshes. In May, 1943, they were even strong enough to ambush and kill the head of the Nazi S. A., Viktor Lutze, in the neighborhood of Kowel-Brest Litovsk.

The policy of the U. P. A. was to destroy the local German administrations which were scattered in the smaller communities and to avoid battle with the greater concentration of forces in some of the leading centres. In this way the Ukrainians were able to take over the practical administration of large parts of the Ukraine and to restore a considerable amount of normal life, while they checked the deportation of thousands or released them from the slave trains. The U. P. A. during these years had its own training schools, it set up on a small scale its own factories for arms and some of the most necessary manufactures, and it governed with the approval of the Ukrainian population.

At this period it had its own printing presses and put out a large number of journals and books of various kinds. These were not only in Ukrainian but, as the U. P. A. grew in size and strength, it attracted the attention and won the sympathies of all the other nations oppressed by the Russians. It formed units of [648] Byelorussians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, etc. and finally on November 21, 1944, it called the First Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, which was attended by some thirty-nine delegates representing thirteen peoples. The Germans

168 725 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[161] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[127] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

In general, the military unification of the armed groups proceeded 668 more rapidly and favorably than did the political concentration. 725 Here the followers of Bandera established in March, 1944, a temporary committee and at a general assembly in June appointed a Supreme Council of Ukrainian Liberation (the UHVR) which assumed the functions of a government. At the same time, through the agreement of the representatives of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv and the National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine, there was formed in September in Kiev the All-Ukrainian National Council (rada) which appointed as its president Prof. Mykola Velychkivsky, the Rector of the Kiev Poytechnic. This was rather under the control of the Melnykivtsy, and was opposed to the UHVR. Yet these differences tended to become academic, in view of the strengthened position of General Taras Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A.

The opposition of the U. P. A. to the German forces was therefore in a sense an opposition behind the lines. It had been facilitated by the German tendency to base their hold on the country through various strong points, while their main forces were advancing to the east and fighting against the Red Army. With the German defeat at Stalingrad in the RSFSR, they began a new retreat and this brought the Soviet forces back into the picture and placed new burdens upon the U. P. A.

In Galicia there had been formed with German toleration a 721 regular Ukrainian division, the Galician Division, on the condition that it would only be employed against the Bolsheviks and would be maintained as a distinct unit. Yet the Germans had no intention of allowing this division to gather strength. They soon replaced the higher officers with Germans and officially called it the 14 Waffen Grenadier Division der Waffen SS., even though in no other case were Slavs of any kind assigned to the SS. This division took part in some battles with the Bolsheviks in the Carpathians. With the breaking of the German front, the German military men made renewed efforts to enroll this division and to create other units in a regular Ukrainian army under General Shandruk but

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

The Return of the Communists

The struggle of the U. P. A. against the returning Communists was no less bitter than the struggle with the Nazis but it was under very different conditions and the forces involved were more unequal. In the first place, the bulk of the fighting came after the conclusion of the hostilities of World War II and at a time when the Sovietophilism of the Western democratic powers was at its height. 725 668

The Nazis were during the entire period engaged with the Soviet forces beyond the borders of the Ukraine and while they attempted to maintain their position in the Ukraine, they frequently counted upon their ability to hold the chief road junctions and communities and exerted less effort to keep their garrisons in every separate village. The Soviet policy was to master the entire country and subject every aspect of Ukrainian life to their own power and control. They could therefore the more easily rely upon the use of overwhelming forces and endeavor to maintain a steady and never-ending pressure, while at the same time they could invoke every weapon in their propaganda arsenal to blacken their opponents in the mind of the democratic world.

Then, too, with the ending of formal hostilities there was no longer the possibility that the U. P. A. by its attacks upon one of its enemies could secure the weapons that would serve it in good stead against the other. This had been a marked feature of the earlier campaigns, for the Soviets had reconquered Kharkiv in the late fall of 1942, only to lose it in early 1943 and to recover it again later in the year. The Red Army recovered Kiev on November 6. In the spring of 1944 the Germans were forced to evacuate Lviv but they recovered the city and held it until the end

725 668 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A. had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrainians [208] were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided [186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 648 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign
and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [208]
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

661 Minister of War, to endeavor to suppress these bands. Despite
668 unprecedented torture of the population, the Soviets found that
725 their progress was not so great as they had expected, for few of the Ukrainian units in their forces were enthusiastic about the campaign, when they saw the measures that the government was taking against their own families.

In the spring of 1946, they made another attempt, this time using some fifteen divisions of NKVD troops from the Far East, Siberia and Leningrad under the direct control of General Colonel Moskalenko. The authorities had been goaded to this renewed demonstration of force by the fact that the town of Stanislav in the Carpathian area had been seized by five battalions of the U. P. A. on October 31, 1945 as a discouragement to the Ukrainians to participate in the Soviet elections called for February 10, 1946. Despite the efforts of the Soviet guards, a considerable portion of the population failed to vote and when the attacks upon them were pressed, a detachment of the U. P. A. succeeded on May 3, 1946, in ambushing Moskalenko and killing him and his chief aids. This ended another campaign and still left the U. P. A. in control of parts of the Carpathian area.

668 In addition to these operations on purely Ukrainian territory,
725 the U. P. A. undertook several raids across the borders in order to encourage dissatisfaction with Soviet rule among some of the neighboring peoples. Thus they established contact with similar groups in Slovakia, Byelorussia and Lithuania, while others cut their way across Hungary into Yugoslavia to join forces with the opponents of Communism in that area.

The raids into Slovakia were especially successful throughout 1945 and 1946 and were continued on a smaller scale during the next years. They served as an encouragement for the anti-Communist elements of the population and, of far more importance in the long run, they attracted the attention of Western journalists who for the first time began to realize the extent of the discontent that prevailed in the Soviet Union. More than that, with every step to the West, they were brought closer to the Western Zones of Germany and Austria and several well-armed detachments have

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during the past years fought their way into the American Zone, laid down their arms and surrendered. These brought the first really definite information to the West and while they have not received the attention that they deserved, they have undoubtedly encouraged the almost frantic desires of the Great Russian emigrés to pretend that they have an efficient underground operating at home.

The result of these raids produced an impression even upon the Czechs. Before the Communist coup d'état which placed the Communists in control of that country, the Czech Minister of War under Dr. Benes was approached by the Soviet authorities and asked for joint action with the Soviets and the Communist Poles to check the opposition to Soviet rule and to project joint operations on a large scale.

On March 29, 1947, General W. Swierszczewski, the Communist Polish Vice Minister of War, was killed near the town of Baligrod. This again was too startling a revelation of the discontent and on May 12th of the same year, the three governments of the USSR, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia concluded a treaty of mutual assistance against this movement.

Faced by the increasingly organized power of the Communist regimes, the U. P. A. has been obliged to proceed with more caution and it has largely replaced mass movements with operations on a smaller scale with the idea of keeping alive a spirit of resistance within the country. It is becoming increasingly difficult for it to publish and circulate pamphlets but it is still able, in case of necessity, to impede seriously the Soviet attempts at deportation of the Ukrainian population and again and again it is able to damage severely the Motor Tractor Stations.

On March 5, 1950, General Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A., was tracked down and killed in the village of Bilohorska in the very neighborhood of Lviv. He had proved himself a more than competent leader and had been the soul of the U. P. A. since its foundation in 1943. His parents, his wife and his children had all perished in the struggle but he had never wavered in his belief in a final victory and he had become an almost legendary figure.

668 His death did not end the fighting, for he was succeeded in
735 command by Colonel Vasyl Koval. Even operations were not suspended, for it is known that late in September of the same year, a detachment of the forces seized the town of Mukachiv in the Carpathians and retired to the mountains with the records of the MVD office there and two prisoners who had made themselves particularly obnoxious by their cruelty and their abuse of the local population.

Thus under the present circumstances the primary task of the U. P. A. is to maintain itself in being as an armed underground, to encourage the population, both of the Ukraine and the other groups oppressed by the Russian Communists, and to carry on certain types of propaganda and of terroristic work which will serve to keep on the anxious seat the masters of the Kremlin. At the moment it does not have the possibility of undertaking by itself those extensive operations that it has done in the past but it is not idle and in the well-hidden bunkers and the forests, it is fostering those traditions which can be again galvanized into activity, if the moment for action arrives.

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.

727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

●[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

6: Armstrong
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Ukraine RD1

[For a detailed account of nationalism treated as a political movement both within and outside of the Ukraine during the years of 1939 and 1945, see category 116, entire source]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668* alien aspects of life in the city. A certain number of local Ukrain-
186 ians accepted this campaign enthusiastically, sometimes carrying it further than the newcomers themselves. Others, although Ukrainian by background, had long been used to employing the Russian language and associating freely with persons of Russian ethnic origin. Consequently, the "purifying" process meant in many cases serious disruption of their accepted way of living and social relationships.

Because of the extreme importance of this factor it is worth describing in some detail a case which provides a striking illustration of the Nationalist psychology during this period. It is contained in the diary of a prominent Kiev author, Arkadii Liubchenko, who was evacuated by the Soviet forces but managed to remain in Kharkov until the German arrival. He then made contact with the Mel'nyk groups (which, as was previously pointed out, pursued the same policy there as in Kiev). Always nationalist, he soon became an enthusiastic convert to the creed of integral nationalism. In December, through his association with the Nationalists, he obtained a post on the Kharkov newspaper, *Nova Ukraïna*. Shortly afterwards, a Kharkov writer named Filipov appeared in the editorial offices; he told Liubchenko that he had prepared an article on the evils of the Communist regime which he wished to publish. When Liubchenko turned it down because it was written in Russian, Filipov protested that his mother had been Ukrainian and that he would submit the article in Ukrainian, as the question of language was indifferent to him. This brought the sneering reply that real Ukrainians, such as those dominating *Nova Ukraïna*, could have nothing to do with one who could not make up his mind whether he was a Ukrainian or a Russian, since such a person was an "internationalist" just like the Bolsheviks.[29] It may easily be imagined what effect such ideas had upon the rebuffed applicant. This is especially the case, since work for an organ like the newspaper was for many not merely a matter of prestige, or even of expression of opinion, but of life
511 and death. With the rapidly deteriorating food situation in Kiev
228 and Kharkov, employment by an agency which was recognized by

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[29] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 25.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

538 serfs, the dreams of past glories, such as they live in the popular songs, are the principal themes of Chevtchenko. We find in them both romanticism and a strong expression of social aspirations. In placing Chevtchenko on the level of the greatest European poets we are obliged to state that the subjects which inspire his poetical works are more limited than those of a Poushkine or a Mickiewicz.

Chevtchenko, the peasant and man of the people, was an instinctive revolutionary in the political sense of the term. He revolts against autocracy and against the lords, and with all his force he appeals for aid for his oppressed brothers and for the struggle for freedom which fascinates him. Though his poetic feeling was high and his lyricism rich, his subjects never go beyond the limited circle of the struggles of the serfs with the lords. One can easily imagine the effect which his poems produced in the circles of the Russian intelligentsia, in which he had been triumphantly received, as they were also dreaming of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

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538 The Universities of Kharkov and of Kiev, founded by the Imperial Government, one in 1805 and the other in 1834, were the rallying centres of the intellectual movements of Southern Russia. They produced the celebrated historian Kostomarov, who became the spokesman of Liberalism and of the cultural awakening of the Ukraine.

The active enthusiasm of these young intellectuals with revolutionary tendencies led to the creation of a secret society in Kiev, the 'Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius,' which was almost immediately discovered by the police. The conspirators took the road to Siberia. In 1847 Chevtchenko was condemned to seven years of service as a simple soldier in a far-away garrison. This relatively light sentence—followed, it is true, by the prohibition of writing and painting (he was a painter of talent at the same time as a poet)—was

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

imposed on a revolutionary with destructive ideas and 668
not on a nationalist Ukrainian. It is only after the 538
accession of the Emperor Alexander II in 1855, when a more Liberal mood became apparent in Russia, that the deportees of Kiev were able to return to Europe.

Some years later Chevtchenko died. Kostomarov, on the contrary, settled at the University of St. Petersburg where, during long years, he wrote his great historical works. Having become a well-known historian and, with age, more moderate, he nevertheless remained, during the whole of his life, a regionalist patriot of the Ukraine, which he wanted to see included in the framework of a great Russian Federation governed by Liberal principals. Even the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, despite its revolutionary extremism, had had no more than federalist ideas and had never dreamed of the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. This is confirmed by the Ukrainian historian of note, M. E. Borschak, in his interesting study, published in the *Slav World*. He writes that 'the Ukrainian movement was then free of any ideas of separatism, of which we did not find any traces when analysing its ideology.'

Let us repeat again : The struggle, in the Ukraine as in the whole of Russia, was begun in the name of Liberalism and of Social Reform against an existing political and social order, not against Russia in the name of the Ukraine, and in this the Ukrainian movement differed deeply from the national movements of the ethnically non-Russian groups. At the time when thousands of Poles, poor and rich, peasants and aristocrats, socialists or monarchists, were being deported to Siberia for wishing to separate Poland from Russia, *not a single Ukrainian* joined the convoys of political deportees as a partisan of the autonomy or the independence of his country. If thousands of Ukrainians settled in the

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668 Siberian *taiga*, it was for having been republicans or
538 socialists or for having struggled against Tsarism but
not against Russia.

538 Sometimes it is claimed that Chevtchenko was personally hostile to everything Russian. But he seems to have been nothing of the kind. An admirer of the 'noble spirit' of Gogol, Chevtchenko himself wrote his personal diary in Russian and he has left us no less than eleven novels and some poetry written in the same language, of which two poems were written before his exile. By conviction and by temperament a revolutionary, Chevtchenko felt himself intimately united with the opposition circles in Great Russia and belonged, as such, to the great family of Russian men of letters.

[609] On the other hand, always true to the popular feelings and sharing with the Ukrainian peasants the hostility towards the German and particularly towards the estate-owners and the school-teachers, he vituperates, in his *Epistle to Compatriots*, against their subjection to German intellectual and cultural influence. When speaking of his young compatriots he says that they blamed their parents 'as they have not taught them to chatter in German in their childhood.' And Chevtchenko laments that 'Ukraine, such are your sons, your young flowers, watered with ink in the German hothouses.' He equally revolts against the vanity of Ukrainian youth, taught by German scholars of whose infallibility they are convinced :

> 'I have seen everything, I know everything.
> There is no hell nor paradise,
> Nor God :
> There is nought but I,
> And the small angular German,
> And nothing more. This is enough, little brother,
> But what do you represent in reality ?
> . . . As the German says : we do not know.'

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Sometimes these laments bear a character of bitter 538
irony. The pretended infallibility of German opinion concerning the fate and the history of the Ukrainian people exasperates him. 'The German will tell you: You are Mongolians. Yes, Mongolians, nude descendants of Tamerlaine clothed in gold. The German will tell you: You are Slavs. Yes, Slavs, unworthy great-grandsons of glorious ancestors.'

While ironizing about the faithful pupils of the German school he continues: 'They spoke according to German precepts in such a way that the German himself, though a great professor, could understand nothing of it . . . at Sitch the German, full of wisdom, grows the potato and you buy it and eat it for your health and you glorify the Zaporoges . . . but by whose blood has this earth been fertilized to produce the potatoes? . . . Her own children have led the Ukraine to the edge of the precipice, they have crucified her worse than the Poles, they want to teach them, at least they pretend it . . . they want to train this blind old man which is the Ukraine under German influence.' (*Kobzar.*)

For him the German question was not only one of literature since he, his sister, and his two brothers were serfs of the German estate-owner Engelhardt, who was noted for his coarseness and the absence of any culture.

The Liberal era which began in Russia with the 668
accession of Alexander II gave broad satisfaction to the 175
aspirations of the circles of the former opposition. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, the inauguration of municipalities elected by the people, the radical reforms based on the permanence of judges, and the establishment of juries and judicial guarantees, eliminated the major reasons for the old revolutionary leanings. A wide movement of reconciliation began to develop which would probably have benefited the Ukraine as

668 175 well as the whole empire. The Imperial Government was clearly inclined to the idea of a regime of constitutional monarchy, based on the cultural autonomy of the various Russian territories and on the application of sufficiently broad systems of political autonomy to the ethnically non-Russian majorities.

As before, the Government was in no way opposed to the publication of books and journals in the Ukrainian language.

000 This whole evolution was compromised by the Polish insurrection of 1863. One knows that in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I committed the mistake which the great Catherine had taken care to avoid at the moment of the partition of Poland. He annexed the greater part of the ethnically Polish territory, the Grand duchy of Warsaw. Despite all the attempts at the establishment of an autonomous regime, the 'Polish question' became henceforth the most vulnerable point of internal Russian policy. During the Liberal era of Alexander II the autonomous political regime was naturally intended to be applied first of all to Poland. Nothing came of this attempt except a new and violent Polish insurrection. The insurgents, traditionally attached to the old conception of the Great Poland of former times, maintained the old pretensions to the Ukraine and White Russia. The programme of Prince Adam Czartoryski, the forerunner of the Polish insurrectionist movement, envisaged the co-ordination of the Polish and Ukrainian movement, the latter to be included in the plan of the Polish insurrection, in order to shake the omnipotence of the Russian Empire and to create a Slavonic federation under the direction of a Great Poland on her ruins ! The efforts to draw the Ukrainian and the White Russian peasants towards her were to experience a fatal check ; the peasants did all they could to facilitate the task of

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517 the Russian Ukraine had resource to Galician publications and, from time to time, they published their own works in that country. It is as a result of this that the Chevtchenko Society was founded at Lvov, which has since held the predominant place in the Ukrainian movement.

Following the example of Chevtchenko, another influence joined the popular so to say 'folk-lore' tendency of the literary Ukrainian movement: it was the social question, identical with that which dominated the literary spirit of the whole of Russia.

565 The second half of the eighteenth century, which had
668 seen the union of Western Ukraine with Russia and the
● colonization of the shores of the Black Sea, was at the same time the epoch of the greatest development of the privileges of the aristocracy. We shall not be able to go into the details of this evolution, which would go far beyond the purpose of this book. Let us only note that after the death of Peter the Great in 1725 the new nobility, of military origin, became the greatest political force in the State. This nobility definitely emancipated itself from its old bondage to the State and at the same time transformed the dependence of the peasants, which had hitherto not been unconditional, into a real servitude. Thus Catherine II established in Russia, as also in the Ukraine, a new political and social order which was founded on the privileged position of the aristocracy which had carried her to power, and on the servitude of the peasants. She conferred similar rights on the Ukrainian nobility as those of the aristocracy of the whole empire and, moreover, liberally distributed the new lands to the landlords. Since that time the question of the servitude of the peasants, a distant but direct prelude of the Revolution, became an open wound of the Tsarist regime.

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One knows that the movement of ideas aiming at the abolition of servitude began to appear in the higher layers of society at the epoch of the Napoleonic War. Quite naturally it appeared together with an interest for everything popular and was, at the same time, inspired by the ideas fashionable in the West: on the one hand encyclopædism and voltairianism and on the other freemasonry and carbonarism. It could not fail to spread in the Ukraine, as elsewhere.

Thus a secret society, the 'United Slavs,' was formed, among whose members were not only Ukrainian officers and officials, but also actual Great Russians. A naïve romanticism reigned—oaths were sworn on swords and speeches made in the style of Plutarch, associated with a passionate love of popular traditions and with the desire to lighten the destiny of the peasant masses under the burden of servitude. Following the example of the romantic revolutionaries of the West, the young conspirators dreamed of the epochs of the past and of the Cossack epics, the heroes of which appeared to them as champions of liberty. Kotliarevsky himself, without belonging to the 'United Slavs,' was intimately connected with masonic circles, and his amazing pamphlet, *Travesty of Aeneid*, already denounced the social weaknesses and injustices of the epoch.

Conforming to the ideas of romantic and revolutionary nationalism, the 'United Slavs' aimed at a republican and democratic federation of all the Slavs. Their pro-Ukrainianism represented only a link in the Pan-Slav revolutionary chain, and it was diametrically opposed to a rupture between the Ukraine and Great Russia. One of the principal chiefs of the Ukrainian movement, Gorbatchevsky, wrote in his memoirs, in Russian, that the success of the insurrection 'might have signified a new era in the history of the Russian people.'

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668 186 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 545 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

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Government authorized the creation of a Ukrainian 536
language theatre, limiting, however, the subjects which 545
could be treated. In conforming to the official point of view, according to which Ukrainian was only a local Russian dialect, it forbade the showing of plays other than those which bore a popular and local character. But this restriction could not seriously hinder the development of Ukrainian dramatic art, as it was the chief aim of the whole Ukrainian literature to treat subjects taken from the popular life. The success of the Ukrainian Theatre of Kiev did not fail to find imitators. Amateur troupes were formed almost in all parts of Russia and especially in the country, which successfully exploited the artistic qualities of a people so richly gifted.

As for Galicia, the political movement always 668
continued to develop rapidly here.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new figure appeared on the Ukrainian political arena, that of Dragomanov (1851–95), whose role was to become enormous.

Born in Russian Ukraine, he soon joined the intellectual revolutionary circles. Following the example of other revolutionary organizations in Russia, that of *Stara Gromada* of Dragomanov sent him abroad to spread there, as a political *émigré*, the ideas of a revolutionary Ukrainianism. Dragomanov at first allied himself with the Galician circles and settled in Austria, but he could not remain here as a result of his ‘ too red ’ ideas. After this he took the road to Geneva, the rallying centre of political *émigrés* from the old Russia. There he founded a political review, *Gromada*, and undertook, from his exile in Geneva, the direction of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. The impulse which he gave it was extremely vigorous. It led to the formation of a new party, tinted

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668 with radicalism, the Popular Ukrainian Party, which broke with the old clerical traditions of Galician Ukrainianism.

Dragomanov was a republican and, consequently, above all anti-Tsarist. He had developed under the influence of positivist and socialistic ideas which were strongly tinted with syndicalism in him. He shared fundamentally the leading ideas of the revolutionary movement as it appeared in the west.

Republican and socialist, Dragomanov was the champion of the free existence of the people. These themes, in the spirit of the epoch, were indissolubly united. But Dragomanov was not anti-Russian. He only had a contempt for the chauvinists who, to glorify the Ukraine, wanted to belittle Russia at all costs. 'The Ukrainian Nation,' he writes, 'cannot obtain political liberty by taking the path of separatism, but only together with the other nations and territories of Russia, along the path of federation.' In this he continued the federalist tradition which had been that of the whole Ukrainian political movement. Dragomanov saw the 'Free Russia' as a federation of several national entities, themselves divided in their turn into autonomous territories.

. . . . . .

In Galicia, however, the movement was to go far beyond the aims which had been intended by its spiritual fathers. A pronounced hostility to everything Russian appeared in Ukrainian political circles. And the Austrian Government, more and more convinced of the inevitability of a conflict with Russia, began to take an interest in the Ukrainian movement and to give it its support.

The penetration of Ukrainian separatism in Russia met at first with great difficulties. Ukrainianism as a cultural, regionalistic, and even federalist movement had not ceased to exist in Russia. On the eve of the

first Russian revolution, that of 1905, one realized at 668
St. Petersburg and began to understand that this movement was not in itself a danger to the unity of the empire. The Governor-General of Kiev, Kleigels, in a good position to judge it, explained it in precisely this sense in his reports to the Imperial Government. But at the same time the Tsarist police, generally very well informed of everything which concerned it, was convinced that the Ukrainian *separatism* was but a weapon of the Austrians; it considered, moreover, that its success in Russia was almost insignificant.

Among the other expressions of the cultural life of the 177
Ukraine, western influences have been particularly strong 341
in the artistic domain and especially in architecture and in decorative art.

The architecture of Kiev, at the period when it flourished most, had above all been a simple branch of byzantine art, transplanted without any modification to Russia. In the north, however, architectural art, although of byzantine inspiration, soon developed original forms of a purely national character.

Kiev, close to Byzantium, was too profoundly impressed by the splendours of Constantinople to be quite independent of them. The celebrated historian of Russian art, Grabar, notes that at the end of the twelfth century architects from Novgorod were invited to Kiev in order to replace the Greek masters by native Russians and to build churches and palaces in the national style. The people of Kiev were amazed by it.

Besides the more important assimilation in the north, the style of religious architecture (the only which was of importance in the old Russia) was quite similar throughout the whole extent of the old Slav-Norse State.

Later, when the centre of gravity of Southern Russia was moved towards the west to the lands of Galicia and

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000 to make the Ukrainian idea one of the principal pivots of German claims.

175 If, under Austrian direction, one did not dare to speak
●668 of separatism to the prisoners, the German general
701 staff, the new master of the Ukrainian movement, thought of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State, under German control, and gave its propagandists directions in this sense. From 1915 the Little Russians who agreed to declare themselves Ukrainians and not Russians were sent to the camp of Radstadt. In this camp specialists of the Ukrainian question, under the direction of Professor Bezpalko, undertook a series of lectures in which they drew pictures of the independence and liberty of the Cossacks for the benefit of their hearers, appealing to them to reject the 'heinous yoke of Asiatic Muscovy.' Towards the beginning of 1917, that is to say after two years of assiduous work, the German general staff succeeded in recruiting, in the camp, 15,000 prisoners. The regiment of 'Taras Chevtchenko' was created. This regiment consisted of eight companies and had about 1600 men. The soldiers of this regiment, looked upon as undoubted partisans of the independence of the Ukraine under German protection, were armed and equipped in readiness for being used in a possible offensive in South Russian regions. The remainder was divided into four groups:

1. About 1500 men formed the *Sitch* (the name of the ancient Cossack community) and enjoyed the complete confidence of the German authorities with regard to their loyalty to the new Ukrainian cause, without yet being entrusted with arms.

2. The 'apprentices,' about 3000, still considered as not absolutely reliable but already somewhat influenced by the propaganda.

3. The 'candidates,' about 3000, those who were

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neutral or indifferent to the question but without marked hostility. 175 668 701

4. Finally the 'opponents,' about 6000, who, although they had agreed to take the name of 'Ukrainians,' were actively opposed to separatist propaganda. They were continually sent to penal work and had to undergo severe and frequent punishments.

Thus of the 15,000 men who, enticed by the promise of an improvement of their lot, had agreed to join the Ukrainian units, one could only rely with difficulty on 3000 (the Chevtchenko regiment and the *Sitch*) who had been really affected by the propaganda. At this period the number of Russian prisoners exceeded 3,000,000, of whom at least 700,000 were Ukrainians, which confirms the absolute failure of this movement.

It would be interesting to remember that from the Russian side the same policy was inaugurated with respect to the prisoners of war of Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, etc., origin. This move enabled one to establish whole divisions composed of Slavonic minorities. From the beginning of the war Austro-Hungarian military units formed of Slavs, and especially of Czechs, went over to the Russians with their officers, arms, and baggage. Not a single similar case occurred in the Russian Army, which included many entirely Ukrainian regiments. On the contrary, according to the evidence of high Russian and German officers, the Ukrainian regiments were among the best troops, often used as shock units, the most famous of which was the 'Iron Brigade' commanded by General Denikine, future commander of the White Army.

To sum up, the political movements of autonomy and of Ukrainian separatism gave no tangible results despite a subsidized propaganda having the support of such powerful organisms as the central empires.

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When the February Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg no political Ukrainian movement developed in the early stages. Quite naturally the intellectual circles obtained more liberty to spread their ideas, which were not anti-Russian.

The municipal elections undertaken at Kiev almost immediately after the February Revolution, and which had undoubtedly taken advantage of all the liberties which characterized the first days of all revolutions, gave a result which clearly shows the almost complete non-existence of a Ukrainian political movement. In fact, of ninety municipal councillors the so-called Ukrainian parties obtained only six places, and that was in the capital of the Ukraine itself.

All classes of society hoped that the Provisional Government which replaced the Monarchy would be able to maintain the front and would allow the country to convoke a National Assembly which would decide the future political regime on the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. As soon as the active members of the Ukrainian political organizations of Galicia entered the Russian Ukraine they organized a kind of Ukrainian committee at Kiev, which started its autonomist political work. On 24 March 1917 the Ukrainian Associations spread over the whole territory were called upon to send their representatives to Kiev to form the first nucleus of a future Ukrainian Parliament. Although only the representatives of such Associations which had declared themselves Ukrainian were invited to this assembly, and although the direction of the assembly was entrusted to Galician Ukrainians, under the Presidency of Professor Hrouchevsky, not only was the idea of separatism absent, but the autonomous aspirations were of the most mild kind. This first assembly of Ukrainian deputies took the name of 'Rada' (the name

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of the Cossack Assembly of the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), which means 'Diet' or 'Council' in Ukrainian. 175 668 ● 642 Once installed, it tried to establish relations with the central Provisional Government, whose power became more and more fictitious. The menace of a Bolshevik *coup d'état* hung over the Government of St. Petersburg, a fact which allowed the Rada to justify its own establishment in declaring itself alone capable of protecting the Ukraine from Bolshevik invasion. This political manœuvre had many chances of success. The Ukrainian peasant was fundamentally hostile to Bolshevism, to the social levelling, and to the collectivization of the land. Nevertheless, anxious for the peace which the Bolsheviks had promised, the Ukrainian peasant lent them his ear. The leaders of the Rada, loyal to the principles of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine,' were also not opposed to the idea of an immediate peace and their promises to preserve the Ukraine from Bolshevism and to conclude peace with the central powers was their most important trump card. The Provisional Government, in a state of complete disintegration and without any remaining support, hastened to recognize the Rada as a political organization, although no election in the proper sense of the word had taken place at the time of its formation. A statute, known under the name of 'Universal,' was instituted on Ukrainian territory. After the agreement between the Provisional Government and the Rada, Ukrainian autonomy was recognized but was limited to questions of language and culture and to the organization of local administration.

All other important questions, including the agrarian question, were left to the future National Pan-Russian Assembly. The administrative activity of the Rada was, at the beginning, limited to the town of Kiev alone, where its assemblies took place. During the summer of

175 1917 the propaganda agents of the Rada covered the
●668 whole country where they organized meetings and
642 distributed pamphlets. They tried to persuade the proprietors of land that their aspirations would be more easily realized within the framework of an autonomous State and underlined the impotence of the Central Government in the face of a Bolshevik attack. The Ukrainian peasant, like that of the Volga and of Siberia and like the Cossacks of the Don, opposed the revolutionary theories, and it is in these countries that they met with the strongest opposition. The Rada could not have a better justification of its authority in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant than the statement that the Bolshevik movement, of Great Russian origin, was imported into the Ukraine from the outside, which, moreover, was true. The title which the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno, gave to his book on the Civil War, *The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine*, is singularly significant. The leaders of the Rada were careful not to proclaim their separatist ideas openly, knowing that such ideas would never find the support of the popular masses. Profiting, however, by the decay of the Provisional Government, they formed, with its consent, a sort of Ministry which took the name of 'General Secretariat,' and which declared itself the supreme power in the Ukraine on 29 July of the same year. The agrarian movement which spread over the whole territory of the Ukraine aimed especially at the great landowners, most of whom, especially in the west, were Poles. Thus the real popular movement took the form of the ancient quarrel between the peasants and the lords and developed quite independently of the Ukrainian movement represented by the Rada. When, in October 1917, the Provisional Government fell as the result of a Bolshevik insurrection, the only official

authority existing in the Ukraine was represented by 175
the General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada. 668 ●
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The peasants, hostile to Bolshevism, did not find any other political organization on which they could lean. Mistrusting the organizations of the Right (which were later to form the political nucleus of the White Armies) and equally fearing the local democratic municipalities where the intellectual and Jewish elements dominated, openly hostile to the working class which was almost entirely Bolshevized and consisted of non-Ukrainian elements, the farmers seemed to tend more and more towards the support of the Rada which seemed to be the only force capable of realizing their aspirations. Nevertheless the first clash between the elements which accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine and those which rallied to Bolshevism, was not to the advantage of the first. The agrarian question meant much to them. The Ukrainian Rada was unable to formulate a clear policy with regard to this most important question. Its resistance to the anarchical division of the lands, supported by the Bolsheviks, rapidly reduced the number of its supporters and the already small authority enjoyed by the General Secretariat in the eyes of the peasant mass. Nevertheless, on 20 November, the Rada proclaimed a democratic Ukrainian Republic. It is at this period that the allied military missions then resident at Kiev recognized *de facto* the Ukrainian Republic. At the same time the fourth 'Universal' was promulgated, one of the articles of which declared that the independence of the Ukraine was considered indispensable only because the rest of the Russian territory had fallen to the power of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to remember this detail because it again proves that, even in politically favourable circumstances, the Rada did not dare openly to declare its separatism. This act did not increase the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and
every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

48 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
727 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to
give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642
of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727
by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German
Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became
very frequent and summary executions became general
throughout the country. The hate of the peasant
population was directed against the Austro-Germans
and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies
of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset,
except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious
hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German
infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The
Government, incapable of acting without looking for
the support of the military forces of the invader, did not
escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain
itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which
was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces
and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to
leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that,
hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support,
and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence,
the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668
soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire,
revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian
country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed
from their posts after the establishment of the
Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement
and received, at first, the unconditional support of the
peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany
Army in which the Galician element predominated.
Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669
marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman.
Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no
difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German
troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175 Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517 foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kovalevsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich, Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, — were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Buko- 175 vina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 186 Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of [668] the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council — a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrainians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517] Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814] Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Chernivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician Diet.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to
ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern
Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian
Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this
party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its
first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in
Bukovina.

86 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in
Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories
were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905
gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the
Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded
autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted
in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted,
and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian
authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the
Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University
in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded
the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger
for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish
nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The
Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University
in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian movement
661 in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence,
the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia
and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out
'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a
Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov
to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in
the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of
Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought
heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools,
press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russification
661 was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

CHAPTER II

UKRAINE DURING THE REVOLUTION

1917—1920

1. The Ukrainian Central Council

000 In March 1917, the revolution overthrew the Tsarist Government in Russia. This enabled the oppressed peoples of the former Tsarist Empire to declare their rights for political self-determination. These were: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), the Caucasian peoples (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians), the peoples of Turkestan and above all the most numerous nation after the Russians, — the Ukrainians.

668 631 [646] In March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev was formed from the representatives of the Ukrainian political organisations as representative of the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, also elected their deputies to the Central Council, and thus this organ became a provisional Parliament of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council tried first to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine through an agreement with the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov-Kerensky.

But the Ukrainian efforts to attain autonomy met with the resolute opposition of the Russian Provisional Government and of the Russian political parties. The centralist tradition of Tsarist Russia continued to live in Russian political parties with the same vigour even after the fall of the régime. The delegates of the Central Council applied to the Russian Provisional Government in Petersburg to recognise by a public act the right of the Ukrainian nation to autonomy within the Russian state. The Russian Government refused this demand, declaring that the problem of autonomy for Ukraine should be decided by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. This reply could not satisfy the Ukrainians. For it was evident that the Russian Constituent Assembly, with the centralist efforts of the Russian parties having a majority would refuse the autonomous rights of non-Russian peoples.

Thus the Ukrainian Central Council began to realise the necessity for Ukraine to establish an autonomous order itself, without taking into notice the threats of the Russian political parties and the Russian Government. Under these conditions the Ukrainian Central Council issued its '*Universal*' (Declaration) to the Ukrainian nation on June 10, 1917 (old style), which contained among other statements the following words:

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"Ukraine shall be free ... The Ukrainian nation shall have the right to organise its life itself. A Ukrainian Assembly of the Ukrainian nation (Diet), elected in general, equal, direct and secret ballot, shall secure order in Ukraine. All laws securing this order here, in Ukraine, can be issued only by our Ukrainan Assembly".

The policy of the Ukrainian Central Council, of which the great majority was composed of the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties, met with strenous attacks on the part of the Russians. Only the leader of the Russian Communists, Lenin, for tactical reasons seeking support among the Ukrainians in the struggle of his party against the Provisional Government, made the following hypocritical statement:

"No democrat can deny the right of Ukraine for a free separation from Russia (*Pravda* 15. 6. 1917). In reality, Lenin and his party were enemies of the national self-determination of Ukraine and other nations oppressed by Russia. The Russian Communist Government showed it immediately after having seized power in Russia on November 7, 1917.

The development of the Ukrainian political movement forced the Russian Provisional Government to begin negotiations with the Ukrainian Central Council. In summer 1917, an agreement was reached, and the representatives of the parties of all national minorities sent their delegates to the Ukrainian Central Council. But the policy of Kerensky's Russian Government continued to hinder the creation of an autonomous order in Ukraine. The Petersburg Government recognised the rights of autonomy only for the northern part of Ukraine and kept the whole of southern Ukraine under its administration. But even for the realisation of this restricted autonomy the Russian Government put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Central Council. At the end of September 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council passed a resolution to call a separate Constituent Assembly for Ukraine. The Russian Provisional Government, for this reason, began a legal prosecution against the Central Council. But at this time a revolt happened in Russia, the Bolshevik Party seized power (November 7, 1917). This created a new situation in the relations between Ukraine and Russia.

2. Soviet Russia and Democratic Ukraine

668 Bolshevism was the consequence of the previous development of the Russian people, who never had had in their history any free political order. Soviet dictatorship did not meet with any serious resistance in Russia proper. The Russians showed in their attitude towards the Communist rule their traditional 'sense of obedience', as it was expressed by a Russian publicist (Guber, *On the Change of the Sign-Posts:* Prague, 1922)*). Another situation arose in Ukraine and other non-Russian regions of the former Tsarist Empire. The Russian Communist organisation in Ukraine was weak and had no support among the Ukrainian population. Among the Russian and Jewish workers in Ukraine the influence of Democratic Socialism, '*Menshevism*', also predominated. Thus, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council all parties, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish and Polish, acted together against the plans of the Russian Bolsheviks to establish dictatorship in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council blamed Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, and began to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine, independent of the Soviet Russian Government. 668 631 In its '*III. Universal*' from November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed Ukraine a democratic republic. In this document we read:

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties will be guaranteed: freedom of speech, printing, religion, meetings, associations, strikes, inviolability of person and domicile, the right to [563] use local languages in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation had fought for long years for its national liberty, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities remaining in Ukraine; therefore we announce to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal autonomy to secure their right and liberty of self-government in matters of their national life . . ."

In the III. Universal the Ukrainian Central Council fixed the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for December 27, 1917.

The Ukrainian Government did not want to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers which the Russian Communist Government under Lenin's direction was aiming at. Therefore the Ukrainian Central Council in its '*Universal*' of November 20, 1917,

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***) The well known Russian writer Maxim Gorki wrote on the passivity of the Russians towards their oppressors that the "Russians could suffer more than work consciously and honestly" (*Communist International,* No. 3, Moscow 1919).**

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R1

declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, U 668
together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, 631
shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland".

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine

At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections U
for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elec- [666]
tions in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propa- 665
ganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections SU
showed the great difference between the political situation in Rus- 665
sia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship (the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately $^3/_4$ of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party.

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine:* Kharkov, 1929.

4. The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers U.

At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers 648
was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 ● 668 186 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 642 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were 669 forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 656 caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By 186 order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of 668 Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.

● 668 The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Communists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] 668 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January 1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 666 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 3. *Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the
Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for
9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of
the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist
dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given
rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This
was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at
the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
● 668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress
of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of
Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed [162]
for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic,[1] Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[1] [in the year 1922 -- Analyst]

563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

●668 661 563 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine, adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column' among the Ukrainians in Poland.

[725] The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

Attempts on a rising

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 186 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrainians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the development [656] of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the [191] development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow,* 1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban region and the RSFSR, 1932-33--Analyst]

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. 167
had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the
Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest:
to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czecho- 563
slovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the 873
recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian
Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrai-
nian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Econo-
mic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrai-
nian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrai-
nian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin [815]
University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific In-
stitute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed
a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian 563
Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, 186
remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian
Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the
Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name
of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western terri- 563
tories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They 575
are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian
organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in
New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily
Svoboda. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton,
Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will.* There
are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two
World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial
support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools,
from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, far- [162]
mers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about
1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have
their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private
schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg,
Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest poli-
tical organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian
Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in
Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Com- 563
munist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the 575
means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian 668

[668] like *Ukrainian Daily News* in New York. However, the Com-
573 munist agency in America and Canada did not attain the success it had hoped. Among the Ukrainian emigration, the democratic orga-
575 nisations have decisive influence.

In South America too, in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other countries, there are Ukrainian emigrants. These are mostly workers and farmers. They have their cultural and political organisations and publish periodicals in Ukrainian.

The central organisations of the Ukrainians in USA, Ukrainian Congress Committee (UCC), in Canada, Canadian Ukrainian Committee (CUC) and of the countries of South America, created in 1948 the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference for the co-ordination of their activities in the interest of the oppressed Ukrainian people.

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 •668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. *Ukraine after the War*

727 000 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

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*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

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3. *The New Ukrainian Political Emigration*

In consequence of the occupation of all Ukrainian territories by 167
the armies of Soviet Russia, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians 186
had to remain outside the borders of their fatherland. In the first
years after the termination of the war, the Ukrainian emigrants liv- 668
ed in Displaced Persons' Camps in Germany and Austria. Now the Ukrainians can be seen in all European and American countries, in Australia and New Zealand. These are all people who, for national and political reasons, opposed repatriation into a Ukraine oppressed by the Communist Government. They declared repeatedly, when they were threatened with forced repatriation, that they would sooner commit suicide than fall into the hands of their oppressors.

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and America are developing a considerable political and cultural activity. The central institutions of the Ukrainian political parties are remaining in exile where their press is being published, the elementary, secondary and academic schools are being operated — the Ukrainian University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical University in Germany, until 1945 in Bohemia, and others.

After World War II the Ukrainian émigrés have created more [815]
scientific institutions: The Scientific Shevchenko Society, a continuation of the identical Society which had existed in Lviw since 1874, and had been destroyed by the Communist régime, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science. These Ukrainian Scientific Societies are working effectively and have their branches in Europe and in America.

Under these circumstances, when in Ukraine enslaved by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian political life is suppressed and cannot show itself freely, the Ukrainian emigrants think it their duty to speak in the name of their nation in the defence of its rights before civilised mankind. For this purpose the leaders of the Ukrainian parties created the Ukrainian National Council in July 1948, as the political representation of the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian National Council continues the tradition of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic which had been created through the will of the Ukrainian nation in 1918—1919. Many of the participants of the Ukrainian fight for liberation and many of the leaders of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic are still living. These men believe firmly that the time for the free state existence of the Ukrainian nation will come.

phils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This /75 again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad.

(D) FOURTH PERIOD: SINCE THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the 668 ~~first qu~~estions which faced the Provisional Government 642 at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards [646] the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory [131] claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd

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[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

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Government refused to recognize the decisions of the Rada, and thereby strengthened a group of separatists hitherto supported only by the second Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress (June 7). The Rada now issued (June 24) a *Universale*, proclaiming that henceforth the Ukrainian Rada would control Ukrainian affairs and work in federation with the All-Russian Parliament when this should be established; and on June 30 an executive body of the Rada, called the General Secretariat, was appointed.

This step caused anxiety to the Petrograd Government; and on July 12–14 two members of the Duma, Tereschenko and Tseretelli, and subsequently Kerenski, went to Kiev. While granting most of the Ukrainian demands, Kerenski opposed the demand for the formation of a Ukrainian army on the ground that it would mean the break-up of the Russian army. The favourable attitude adopted by Kerenski towards Ukrainian demands caused a split in the Provisional Government of Petrograd; and the Cadets left the Cabinet on July 16.

[669] The reorganized Provisional Government decided to grant autonomy to the Ukraine, but on July 19 a social revolution broke out in Kiev, and the help of the Provisional Government was sought by the Rada for the restoration of order. But before the formal recognition of Ukrainian autonomy by the Provisional Government, which took place on August 17, other riots broke out in Kiev, this time among the Russian or russified town population, who protested against the ' ukrainization ' of South Russia. The recognition of the Provisional Government meant that, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, the General Secretariat of the Ukraine was the recognized authority controlling finance, commerce, industry, agriculture, labour, and other domestic affairs. All measures had to be submitted to the Provisional Government. The Ukraine was to consist of the Governments of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava, and Chernigov; the other Governments mentioned above could be included if

their *zemstvos* so desired. But this measure of autonomy 668
was not accepted. The Rada on August 24 declined 642
to send representatives to the National Council at Moscow, expressed the wish for a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and asked the Provisional Government to define more clearly its own position.

Meanwhile Russian public opinion, even in revolutionary circles, strongly resented the Ukrainian movement. The resentment was expressed in the communication of the Russian War Office to the *Russkoye-Slovo* of September 2, 1917, in which it was alleged that the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine was conducting espionage in Russia on behalf of Germany, and a separatist Ukrainian propaganda among the Russian prisoners of war, that it was in the pay of the German Foreign Office, and that it was giving help to the German armies. To this communication a reply was given by MM. Melenevski and A. Skoropis-Yolturovski, members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, on October 25, 1917, in Stockholm, in which it was stated that the Austrian and German Governments had no part in the foundation of the League, which had been created in Eastern Galicia with the help of the Ukrainian immigrants; that the League based its hopes on the victory of the Central Powers over Russia; that they expressed the wish that the Central Powers should occupy the Ukraine; that they hoped the Ukraine would be fully independent and essentially democratic; that they carried on a cultural war among the Ukrainian prisoners of war in Germany without the help of the Germans; that the German spy of Ukrainian nationality, Yermolenko, had no connexion with the League; and lastly, that the League accepted money from all friends of the Ukraine, including the German Government, and intended to raise a loan from the German Government.

Then came the fall of the Provisional Government. In the Kerenski-Kornilov affair of 1917 the General Secretariat as well as the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils of the Ukraine sent their loyal assurances to

● 668 the Provisional Government. The idea of forming
642 part of a Russian federal republic was still powerful
in the Rada ; and on September 26, 1917, a conference
of forty different nationalities had met at Kiev to
discuss the question of local autonomies under a federal
system. Preparations for a Constituent Assembly,
which was to include 22 members from the Ukraine
and 17 from the Don Cossacks, were set on foot ; while
propaganda was carried on by the ultra-nationalists
and the internationalists, i. e. the Soviets, with a view
to boycotting the Russian Constituent Assembly.

642 In November 1917, after Kerenski's Government
had been replaced by the Bolshevik Soviets, the
Ukraine on the whole was much more in favour of
the latter than were the Don Cossacks, who formed on
November 9 a confederation of a more conservative
character. To save its position among the masses, the
Rada underwent a rapid process of evolution, and on
November 20 published a *Universale* of a radical
character. It proclaimed the 'Ukrainian People's
Republic', abolished all private ownership of land,
introduced State control of production and an eight-hour
day in all factories, removed the death penalty
from the statute book, and finally expressed a hope
that the Ukrainian National Republic would be
federated with the Russian Republic. By doing this
the Rada hoped to check Soviet interference ; it failed
to do so; and from December 19 serious differences
between the Rada and the Soviet Government in
642 Petrograd became apparent. The Soviet Government
728 at Petrograd accused the Rada of giving support to
the Cadets and of siding with the Don Cossacks in
their hostility to the Bolsheviks; while the Rada
declared itself a body elected by Revolutionary Democrats
in the Ukraine, and refused to co-operate with
the Bolsheviks or to send delegates with them to Brest-Litovsk.
It finally declared, on December 24, that, as
the Russian army was disorganized, it would take
military measures for the defence of its borders. Some
of the Ukrainian forces mobilized at that time joined

COSSACKS RD2

as its center. It dealt heavy blows to the Polish- U/175 Lithuanian state in the middle of the seventeenth C/712 century. The arrows leading from Bazadenk to Lwów 726 point out the direction taken by the army of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki to Poland./ /Key inside map: -.-.-. National boundaries. ‥‥Provincial boundaries. ++++ Western boundaries of the Ukrainian voivodeships in Poland. ←←← Campaign of Bogdan Chmielnicki against Poland in the year 1648. ◇ Cossack regimental command. * Seat of the military order "sech".

/57/ In the "Death Quadrangle"

"In a piercing, frosty north wind" on November U/726 16, 1919 there marched passed each other in 'the quadrangle of death, silently, without a military salute, the fragmentary, wretched, barefoot detachments of the West Ukrainian supporting troops and the likewise fragmentary, wretched, barefoot East Ukrainian front-rank troops. The former were going east into the East Podolian area of concentration where the remnants of the West Ukrainian army were to capitulate before the 'Pan-Russians'; the others were going west to Central Volhynia where they were to surrender to the Poles. Both left behind the same landmarks along their way: frozen corpses in the ditches." (39) This was the funeral march of the last soldiers of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The episode of the new Ukrainian statehood began with the March Revolution in Russia in 1917. U/668/642 On March 22, 1917, a few days after the revolution 175 in Moscow, the "Ukrainian Central Council" was formed in Kiyev, consisting of representatives of

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39. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism in the Years 1918 to 1923, page 389.

668 the parties. At the same time the process of making
642 Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on
the front began, so that within a few months the
175 Central Council had about one and one-half to two
million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But
in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council
by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii
government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized
by the four manifestoes which it issued up
to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On
June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central
Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It
was to maintain its own parliament, the Central
Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat.
On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed,
giving particulars as to what was meant by
autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration
for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19,
1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the
Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow.
Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes
were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian
People's Republic, there was mention of federation
648 with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of
People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the
175 Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate
completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for
a federation or similar relationships." But in the
same document of recognition the Council of People's
Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming
of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and
that the Central Council would have to desist from
its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the
People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory
answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council
of People's Commissars would assume that the Central
Council was in a state of open warfare against the
Soviet government." A few days after this recognition
coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops
broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed
a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow's

648 war against Kiyev began.

668 Straightway Bolshevik propaganda made itself felt in the Ukraine. It was easy to unleash revol-
175 utionary energies, after the Central Council had prepared the ground with the same arguments, albeit in a weaker form. In the country unbridled peasant rebellion against the squires raged. It was arable land and fine cattle and horses on the farms that the peasants wanted; they did not care who ruled in the cities. This was the state of affairs in the Ukraine when on January 22, 1918 the Central Council in Kiyev in a fourth manifesto proclaimed the sovereign "Ukrainian People's /59/ Republic" and put into effect separation from "indivisible Russia". However, at the same time it did not forget to announce that after the overthrow of Bolshevism, there should again be cooperation with Russia. The manifesto which was meant at last to arouse national passions suppressed for so long, was not heard in the noise of general rebellion. A few days after the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the parliament and the government at Kiyev were surprised by a revolt of Bolsheviks and its members were arrested. If they had not been freed by the Ukrainian sharpshooters of the sech who became the nucleus of the later Ukrainian armies, and the corps of free Cossacks consisting of workmen, these parliamentarians would have faced certain death. It was precisely in those days that the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk recognized the independent Ukrainian People's Republic on February 9, 1918. Vienna was facing a famine and needed grain, so the peace was favorable to the Ukraine. For the adjudication of national sovereignty they were obliged to furnish a half million tons of grain. The "peace for bread" had been signed one day when the Bolsheviks drove the Central Council out of their capital. In March the situation became so threatening for the Ukrainian government that it was obliged to appeal to the Central Powers

648 for occupation and riddance of the Ukraine from Bolsheviks. Thereupon German and Austro-Hungarian
•668 troops occupied the country. In Kiyev the Central
175 Powers established military, diplomatic and political representation. In order to take the wind out of the sails of the vigorous Bolshevik agitation, the Central Council nevertheless saw itself forced to continue its revolutionary activity. Thus, against their will, they led "the country toward a complete social-revolutionary dissolution in which East Ukraine had inevitably to fall victim to the Bolshevism of Moscow." (40)

40. Kuchabskyj: *Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism.*

It is obvious that the conservatively-minded German authorities had no understanding of such governmental tricks as would seriously jeopardize /60/ the furnishing of grain. Therefore they supported the attempt of the former aide-de-camp of the Czar and Russian general of Ukrainian origin, Pavlo Skoropadskyj, to introduce the monarchical office of hetman instead of the Republican Central Council. On April 29, 1918 Pavlo
668 Skoropadskyj, the offspring of a hetman family,
175 proclaimed a new hetman state in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the indigenous props of this monarchical regime were very weak. If he had not been protected from the beginning by the authority of the army of occupation, the revolutionary masses would have driven him out along with his few dozens of landowners, industrialists, merchants and officers on the very first day. Skoropadskyj's first efforts were directed toward restoring the pre-revolutionary social conditions in the country, during which process his men did not shrink from severe penal expeditions and from the use of the "traditional Russian wisdom" - the club. This led to repeated bloody rebellions on the part of the embittered peasants. An uneducated, fermenting,

668 destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of
self-administration, a much too small middle class
175 and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,-
these were the elements of the hetman state. But
it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a
national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was
obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled
Russian circles who in the end completely won over
the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary
plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set
642 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced
648 the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia
175 which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four
hours after the announcement of the annexation
of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist
Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National
League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian
counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins
the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic,
at the head of which is a five-man governing
board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of
Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian
government, he made the following confession
in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God
did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

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In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

11: Obermaier--87 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Galicia]* [Volhynia]

Galicia and Volhynia bore the main burden of 668 the struggle of nationalities. The fight was carried on in a legal manner through self-supporting organizations such as economic cooperative societies, private schools and societies of public interest, and illegally through revolutionary secret organizations threatening the state. The first of these secret societies was the "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO). Its members were primarily soldiers of the former West Ukrainian army. A second sabotage organization, that of the Communists, worked hand in glove with the UVO. The UVO was /86/ dissolved in 1928 by Polish agents, which was not a particularly clever achievement, considering the poverty of its members. The same happened to the Ukrainian Communists at the hands of delegated Jews who acted upon orders from the Warsaw office of the Komintern. Meanwhile a new terroristic secret society had been formed, the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN), which has caused the Polish authorities the greatest concern, especially since October 1938. All attempts to dissolve the OUN from within or to neutralize it by creating groups of Polonophiles have failed. Elements that could be bought were often enough obliged to pay for their treason with death.

Two years after the founding of the OUN* in 668 late summer of 1930, the farms and estates of Polish settlers in Galicia went up in flames and 579 in some places the harvest burned up in the fields. Also, telegraph wires were cut. Since it was hard to sell grain, Polish landowners used the terrorist methods of the OUN in individual regions as an excuse to collect insurance fraudulently; they set fire to their own buildings. The answer of the Poles to the wave of sabotage of the OUN* 558 can be read between the lines of the petition of 60 members of the British House of Commons to the

*[i.e., Ukrainian Terroristic Secret Society - Analyst]

11: Obermaier--89 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 The Ukrainians bowed to Polish supremacy in helpless inward wrath. They again covered with straw the torn-up roofs of their houses and they built new libraries to replace the ones that had burned, new dairy farm equipment in place of that which had been destroyed. When in 1934 there was a danger of national Ukrainian institutions being abolished, as well as cooperatives, schools, general educational institutions and so forth, the largest Ukrainian party, the "Ukrainian National Democratic Association" (UNDO), whose members ran the cooperatives, decided to give up the opposition against Warsaw and to begin a "policy of normalization". The UNDO became "loyal" in return for which it received seventeen parliamentary mandates. This did not prevent it, however, from calling attention in the very first session of the Sejm to the Polish Law of Autonomy of 1922, and to continue to point this out at the beginning of each new session of the Sejm. Besides the /88/ representatives of the UNDO, there were two other representatives of the clerical group of the Bishop of Stanislav, Khomyshyn, who tried to represent Ukrainian interests in the Sejm. The remaining Ukrainian parties were not admitted to the elections and in turn boycotted them.

The period of normalization of Ukrainian-Polish relations lasted not even four years; this policy was not popular among the Ukrainians. The old hatred between the two nations broke out anew the moment the Carpatho-Ukrainians won their autonomy. Under pressure of public opinion, the UNDO was obliged to go over again to the opposition. "The policy of normalization brought no results because it was not adhered to by the Poles. The Poles trample on their own constitutional laws. Their constitution guarantees to all citizens equal rights and privileges before the law. But in practice there is no equality. It is almost out of the question for Ukrainians to be admitted to official posts, either in the postal system or on

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

228 railways or in the courts, to say nothing of their being made officers in the army. Private enterprises controlled by the state operate on the same principle. Of the 4000 Ukrainian teachers, one-fourth of them are scattered outside the Ukrainian national territory. Three-quarters of our intellectuals are unemployed. There is the additional fact that it is made impossible for our peasants to acquire land; even in cases where there is a partitioning of a large Ukrainian estate, the land is sold to Polish colonists. Our national banks and cooperatives get practically no credit and the little money lent to us is on a short-term basis. Moreover, the Polish government has created two frontier zones from which it can banish every Ukrainian without stating its reasons. In these frontier zones the voivode is sole ruler. Even the district captain can at any time dispossess any priest, teacher or a cooperative official whom he suspects of being nationalistic. In the end, the present

728 /Facing page 88/ /Map VI: Ukraine in the Years 1917-20. At the end of the first World War the Ukrainian People's Republic was created and lasted for a short time. Finally, after involved struggles against three fronts, the Poles in the West, the Bolsheviks in the North and East and the troops of the reactionary generals Denikin and Wrangel, it perished./ /Keys inside: ▨ Region of the Ukrainian state. ▤ Temporary annexes. ┴┴┴┴ Boundaries of territory occupied by Ukrainian nationals. -·-· Boundaries of the predominantly Ukrainian zone./ /89/ appeasement actions which are being carried out exactly after the 1930 pattern, will force us to give up the normalization policy." (50)

50. Statements made by a leading member of the UNDO party in February, 1939.

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 The least that the UNDO had to do after the establishment of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was to formulate the nature of Ukrainian claims to autonomy. At the beginning of December 1938, the proposal for autonomy signed by fifteen representatives was introduced into the Sejm under the title of: "Constitution of the Province of Halicz-Volhynia". According to the title, the proposal refers to the principality of Halicz-Volhynia of the 13th and 14th century. Territorially all areas inhabited by a Ukrainian majority were to belong to the "Province of Halicz-Volhynia", that is to say, East Galicia, Volhynia, Polesia as well as parts of the voivodeship of Lublin, Bialystok and Cracow. According to this, the autonomous territory would have included about one-third of Poland and contained nine million inhabitants. The aim of autonomy was to be "full political equality with the Polish people and the free cultural and economic development of the Ukrainian people within the boundaries of Poland". The proposal provided for the formation of a legislative diet and a provincial office at Lwów. The laws made by the Ukrainian diet were not to extend to external affairs, the army, the national budget and taxes, currency, customs, postal system, communication systems and matters concerning citizenship and the national police. The proposal was so modest that in practice the Ukrainians were to make laws pertaining only to the school system and judicial affairs. But even these minimal demands were refused by Warsaw with the written reply that the proposal is of such a nature that it changes the constitution and would in this case have to be supported by one-fourth of all the representatives.

As early as December 1938, the Ratification Committee of the UNDO, decided in spite of the rejection, to continue the struggle for autonomy. In a subsequent session in April 1939 /90/, the party which was obliged to steer between the Scylla

11: Obermaier--92 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 of Polish agitation for dissolution and the Charybdi of Ukrainian nationalism, declared itself willing to work with Poland provided autonomy was granted and a status of "legal competence" was established. On May ninth the UNDO in the Sejm adopted the authorization law for the president of the state, in order not to give Poland an excuse for dissolving the cooperatives.

In the summer of 1939 the Polish-Ukrainian 558 relationship resembled a sort of guerilla war. Here and there a house was set on fire, a bullet through a window found its victim, Polish colonists or officials were driven out of a village, a police raid was shot down - and in turn, the Polish bayonets raged mercilessly. To take only two cases at random: on May 8, 1939 Ukrainian representatives in the Sejm placed an interpellation before the Minister of the Interior, according to which the Polish police had seriously injured 16 persons, among them 8 women and girls, with blows administered with the butt end of a gun, at a funeral in an East Galician village. On the same day police officials in the district of Polyana killed a Ukrainian peasant and an eleven-year-old boy by shooting. Several Ukrainians were injured. In a second interpellation there was a complaint that in Libukhora in East Galicia a first lieutenant, a sergeant major and a soldier coerced by means of blows, the cashier and acting head of the Ukrainian library to burn the library which consisted of 300 volumes. On May ninth the Polish Prime Minister, General Skladovski, replied to another Ukrainian interpellation of April twenty-ninth. There were three incidents mentioned: a military assault on the dwelling of the Ukrainian pastor Tustanovich in Komarnyky, a military attack in Zalisci on 63 Ukrainians who were maltreated, and the maltreatment by the police of 17 Ukrainian peasants in Cholhyni. In all three cases the Polish Premier's answers were evasive.

11:Obermaier--107 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

517 While the Ukrainian language was being banned from Kiyev, a new flowering of Ukrainian culture was beginning in the West Ukrainian metropolis of Lwów. In 1873 Ukrainian men of learning [741] founded the "Scientific Shevchenko Society", a free academy. The number of Ukrainian chairs at the University grew. Now that all scholarly activity in the Ukrainian language was curtailed in East Ukraine, professors and writers transferred their field of activity to Lwów where a number of different cultural organizations arose. Kiyev as the intellectual hub of all Ukraine was outstripped by Lwów, in fact, even by Czernovits /now Chernovtsy/. Each of these two cities published more than one hundred Ukrainian works in 1894, whereas Kiyev published only ten works of so-called "literature for the home".

177 The revolution of 1905 only temporarily eased the pressure on Ukrainian cultural life. Freedom of the press and freedom of assembly remained only promises, and the "unity and indivisibility" of the Russian people was nothing but lifeless dogma until in 1917 its defenders were swept away by the seceding peoples.

517 Despite all difficulties, Lwów remained the cultural center of West Ukraine even after the
●668 first World War. Its focal point was the "Scien-
[741] tific /104/ Shevchenko Society" which published its own periodicals and scholarly works. The spiritual trend of West Ukrainian intellectuals, in so far as they were not obliged to emigrate, was directed against traditional sentimentality. Young people were reared to think politically, to be ready for action and for dedication. In accordance with the political aims, the subject matter of present-day West Ukrainian literature shows a preference for the re-awakening of the Ukrainian people, for the heroic struggles of the last few decades, and for the heroic in the Ukrainian landscape.

745
748 This is a picture of the beginning of the new Union.

/112/

Moscow Educates

000 In one thing Lenin proved superior to his enemies and predecessors: he knew how to utilize the social-revolutionary and nationalist-revolutionary forces in the vast Russian Empire for his own ends. With the explosive material which Hetman Skoropadskyj and the counterrevolutionary general Denikin had piled up anew through their forcible restoration of large estates, he destroyed both opponents. He met the collapse of the idea of a Pan-Russian Empire with the slogan of the revolutionary proletarian unified front of non-Russian peoples of the former czarist realm against the capitalist states. It was only for appearances' sake that he complied with the national wishes of the peoples gathered together under Moscow.

•668 In Russian Ukraine, where at the beginning of the Revolution the national consciousness of the great masses of peasants was not yet deeply rooted, Lenin's tactics did not run against insuperable difficulties. The cultured stratum, already not too large, was divided into two camps, one of which sympathized with Bolshevism, while the other regarded an autonomy within the democratic realm of Great Russia as the most favorable solution of the problem of nationalities. Thus from the beginning Lenin had a part of the Ukrainian people on his side, and he subjugated the rest with the help of Muscovite troops during years of bloody civil wars. True, in November 1917, in the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" sovereign rights "including the right of severance and of formation of an independent state" /113/ were promised, but toward the end of the period of the Communist war there was no force left which might have made use of it.

185 exists only in socialism." At the Party Congress in 1939, Stalin corrected these and similar expressions of conceit. He turned against the "fancifulness" of the advance estimates of the last Five Year Plan. The hopes of the proletarian masses of the Union for the promised paradise, nourished for more than twenty years, /183/ were abruptly destroyed by the "father of the people" with his allusion to the sacrifices which are still necessary in order to catch up with the most progressive states. There was still time for that, Stalin said, "and not a little time".

/184/ Emigrants

668 Although the Ukrainian people do not have a state (the Soviet Ukraine is merely a province of Moscow), they have three governments which have their seat in some foreign European country. There is the government of hetman Skoropadskiy which resigned in 1918 and was later revived in exile; then the directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic which originally consisted of five presidents. Its chairman Petliura is dead and its members have scattered. Finally there is a West Ukrainian government. The political emigration [167] from the Soviet Union, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Poland resides almost altogether in Europe. Here it numbers 150,000 souls including the emigrants. Of these about 50,000 East Ukrainians ~~alone~~ are living in what was formerly Poland, 50,000 Ukrainians are living in France, 15,000 without protectorate and 5000 under aprotectorate in Germany, 8000 in Belgium and 5000 each in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The rest are divided up among twelve countries.

The world knows little about the former goverments, nor do they stand out. All of them cling tenaciously to the fiction of their legality. The most active among them is the Petliura government, although it is the very one which suffered the most annihilating military and diplomatic defeat. Around it cluster the remaining supporters of the East Ukrainian dictator who, in spite of Polish betrayal and the most outrageous treatment, convulsively clung to the talons of the White Eagle. Petliura was murdered in Paris in 1926 just as he was preparing, after Pilsudski's coup d'état, to concoct a new scheme with the Polish dictator. In Ukrainian emigré circles not related to the Petliura group /185/ which consists almost primarily of older people, these gentlemen are regarded as Polish agents. In contrast to the rest of the political emigrants, the Petliura followers lived, as a rule, in tolerable circumstances.

It is worth while to examine the program of the Petliura group more closely, for the latter, together with the Poles, followed the political plans of Pilsudski and Petliura. The goal was to smash the Russian colossus and establish an East Ukrainian state under a Polish protectorate. The means to this end was to be a common front of East Ukrainians with the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, preferably with the peoples of the Caucasus, the Don Cossacks, who regard themselves as a separate people, and the Karelian Finns. The White Ruthenians were to be excluded from this alliance;they, as well as the seven to eight million West Ukrainians, were to be left to the Poles. This Polish-Petliura school of thought regarded the neighboring states "that know what the Soviet Ukraine means", that is to say Finland, the Baltic states and primarily the former Poland, as additional allies against pan-Russian Moscow. In case the Soviet Union was to become involved in a war, there was provision made in Warsaw for the raising of an "army of the Ukrainian people's government" which, as far back as 1919 to 1920, was probably to have the honor of conquering Kiyev, the pearl for the Poles. The difficult lot of the West Ukrainians under Polish rule left this group completely indifferent, for "they, of course, have their own parliamentary representation in the Polish sejm", as one of the leading men of the group told the author in February 1939 in Warsaw.

The followers of Petliura were anxious to be regarded as liberal democrats. Their adherents resided primarily in Warsaw and in Paris. Here the group published a fortnightly periodical and a monthly information bulletin with Polish intelligence, in which one could occasionally read that "the cabinet held a regular session". /186/

There were only individual West Ukrainians who belonged to the Petliura group. On the other hand, many East Ukrainians belong to the two other political trends of the Ukrainian emigration. These are, first, the conservative followers of the ex-hetman Skoropadskiy, who have in mind some kind of Ukrainian confederacy with a non-Bolshevik Moscow and aim at a monarchy, and secondly, the adherents of the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN). The hetman followers publish a paper in Chicago; some of them also live in the Reich. The "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" counts among its followers the most active national revolutionary elements of the emigration. The OUN is the only important group with an ideological basis. This young Ukrainian generation formulates modern Ukrainian nationalism on a popularist basis. It is trying to "create a vigorous Ukrainianism, uncompromising in the realization of its national idea". Its goal is an independent state embracing all Ukrainian territories. (133) The leader of this group, until his

133. The Ukraine and the National Policy of Moscow, page 58.

slaying in Amsterdam in 1938, was the head of the

668 sech sharp shooters, Ievhen Konovalets who, after Petliura reached an understanding with the Poles, separated from the dictator. Konovalet's successor is the former chief of staff of the Ukrainian army, chief of the sech sharp shooters Andrey Melnyk who was obliged to flee from Poland in 1938. The OUN has its strongest support in the Ukrainian emigrants in the USA - "Organization for the Political Revival of the Ukraine, New York" -, in Canada and South America. But also among the 150,000 European political refuges and emigrants it has the most adherents of all groups large and small. There are Ukrainian nationalists in almost all Central and West European capitals, among others in Rome, in Paris and in London where the "English-Ukrainian Society" establishes contact with the Ukrainian emigrants in Canada.

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169 /187/ When in the second half of the past century economic conditions became more and more unbearable in the Ukraine, many Ukrainians emigrated; from the Russian Ukraine to East Russia, from Galicia, from Carpatho-Ukraine, and from Bukovina overseas. In 1926, 771,000 Ukrainians lived outside the Ukraine proper in small and large linguistic islands, within European Russia, and 2,138,000 lived in Asia. In the United States there were about 700,000 Ukrainians, primarily workers; in Canada there were 300,000 mostly farmers; in Brazil 50,000 to 60,000, in Argentina 50,000, in the rest of the South American countries 10,000 to 20,000. (134)

134. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 321.

519 Organizations of compatriots of various kinds keep the Ukrainians together overseas. The closest ties are those between the farmers in

175 King and to regain their lost independence. However, his appeal was distrusted because of his loyalty to the Tsar. As a result, only a small Cossack force joined the King's army; and it was defeated in the battle of Poltava on July 10, 1709. Russian military units occupied the entire territory of the Ukraine and made it a province of Russia. Gradually, even the existence of a separate Ukrainian nationality was denied by the Russians; but the spirit of lost liberty could not be completely destroyed. The opposition against the Tsar's oppression was felt and later promoted by the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) who, because of his courage, was forced to spend a considerable length of time in exile. The Russian reaction to the stirrings among the Ukrainian masses inspired by Shevchenko was a more severe and inhuman suppression. The lowest point of Russian chauvinism was reached when the Minister of the Interior, Count P. Valuev, issued on June 21, (June 8, old style) 1863 a ukase in which he angrily stated that "a Little Russian (Ukrainian) nationality never has existed, does not exist and cannot exist."[3] On May 18, 1876, Tsar Alexander II signed in Ems a special order prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language in literature.[4] This order was remitted in 1905 but reimposed in full force in 1914 at the beginning of World War I. The Tsarist policy of oppression of non-Russian peoples was among the factors which contributed to the collapse of its regime in March, 1917.

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•668 After the fall of the monarchy, the non-Russian peoples availed themselves of the first opportunity to regain their freedom.[5] In the Ukraine, a National Central Rada (Council) was spontaneously organized in April, 1917 under the presidency of a well known historian, Mychajlo Hruschevskyj. This National Rada was recognized and welcomed as the representative organ of the Ukraine by the Congress of Ukrainian soldiers in Kiev in 1917, by the Peasants Congress of Ukraine, and by the Worker's Congress, July 1917. The political

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[3] T. G. Mazaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (New York, 1919), p. 304.

[4] D. Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine* (Edmonton, 1939), p. 591.

[5] The major non-Russian nationalities in the former Russian empire such as the Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Georgians, Azerbaijans, Armenians, Kasakhs, etc. have a long history of struggle aaginst Russian imperialism and oppression. However, former historians and Tsarist representatives abroad refer to them as Russians, despite the difference of culture and languages. This oversimplification of the real facts caused much confusion in the Western world in the past. Even today many responsible individuals refer to the Soviet Union simply as Russia.

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• 668 parties which came into legal existence sent, together with national minorities, their representatives to the Rada.

At the beginning, the Rada did not aim to separate the Ukraine as an independent state from Russia, but asked, during the negotiations with the Provisional Government, a territorial autonomy in federation with Russia. It further demanded that the Russian Government abstain from interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. However, this modest demand was first rejected by the Provisional Government in Petersburg, and led the majority of the Ukrainian people into believing that the new Government in Russia was prepared to continue the policy of the Tsars regarding the non-Russian people. As a result, the possibility of establishing peaceful and friendly relations among the various nationalities was jeopardized by the Russians themselves.

Taking note of the strong determination on the part of the people, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued, on June 23, 1917, its first universal "declaration" in which the "Autonomous Ukrainian Republic" was proclaimed. Informing the Ukrainian people about the unsuccessful negotiations with the Provisional Government in Petersburg, the Rada declared that "from this day on, we ourselves will create our own destiny."[6] Simultaneously, a General Secretariat, with Wolodymyr Winnichenko at its head, was formed. It took shape as the Ukrainian Government while the Central Rada was reorganized as the revolutionary parliament.

648 During the short life of the Provisional Government, only the Bolshevik Party took the existing facts into account. Lenin, who previously did not believe in a Bolshevik victory in Russia during his lifetime, recognized, after his return from Switzerland in April, 1917, that administrative incapacity and the political blunders of the Provisional Government offered a reasonable chance immediately to seize political power in Russia. Analyzing the situation, Lenin introduced the program of the Bolshevik Party which promoted such revolutionary slogans as self-determination of nations within Russia and their right

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[6] M. Hrushevsky, *The History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1945), p. 526.

[7] The Seventh (April) Conference of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Labor (Bolshevik) Party, held on May 7-12, 1917 adopted a resolution on the National Question in which the policy toward non-Russian peoples was formulated. Among other points, the resolution stressed: "The right of all nations forming part of Russia to freely secede and form independent states shall be recognized. To negate this right or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its practical realization, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure and annexation. . . ."

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648 ments proved that this was only a formal recognition of existing facts and a desire to win confidence among non-Russian people. The Provisional Government's mistakes and incompetence resulted in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, which led to the establishment of the Soviet regime.[10]

After the revolution, Stalin was appointed Commissar of
648 Nationalities. Lenin believed that the appointment of the non-Russian
668 Dzugashwili to this post would make the Bolshevik slogans even more acceptable to the non-Russian peoples. He had ready plans for the occupation of the Ukraine and other semi-independent countries but did not have the military might needed to crush their national Governments. Therefore, Lenin turned to the method of infiltrating destructive forces into the Ukraine in order to weaken its independence from within. The Bolsheviks were aware of the fact that, if the Ukraine remained independent, Soviet Russia would have tremendous difficulties in carrying out the plan of "liberation" of other countries in the future. Therefore, the declaration of the right of nations to self-determination, officially proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, proved to be valid only as long as it served the purpose of strengthening the Soviet regime. Once the Bolsheviks were in power, they openly demonstrated that between the policy of white and red Moscow toward the Ukraine there was little or no difference. Recognizing this fact, the formerly subjugated nations were even more determined to promote their liberation from Moscow. On November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian National Rada proclaimed independence by issuing the Third Universal. The Government still believed in an eventual federation with a free Russia, which would recognize Ukrainian independence and would abstain from interference in its internal affairs. This viewpoint was expressed in a note to the Allied powers.[11] Again, the Russian anti-Soviet political and military leaders refused to accept such

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[10] Professor Masaryk, former President of the Czechoslovakian Republic and a well known authority on Russia, comments on the easy Bolshevik victory: "The way for Lenin's regime had been prepared by the Provisional Government and by Kerensky, both of whom showed administrative incapacity and entrusted wide spheres of action to bad and incompetent men. . . . Lenin was a logical consequence of Russian illogicality." *The Making of a State, Memories and Observances, 1914-1918* (London, 1927), p. 176.

[11] On December 12, 1917, the Secretary of State for International Affairs of the Ukraine, Shulgin, despatched notes to the Allied powers informing them about the desire of the Ukrainian Government to enter into friendly relations with the free States as an independent power. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 650.

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a solution. At a later date, these anti-Soviet forces indirectly helped the Bolsheviks to remain in power.[12]

On December 17, 1917, Lenin dispatched an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada in which he demanded: recognize the Soviet Government within forty-eight hours or take the consequences of an open war. With this action, the Soviet Government inaugurated the policy of "persuasion" by force. The Rada rejected the Soviet ultimatum in an answer on December 19, 1917, and urged the Ukrainian people to be prepared to defend their freedom.[13] The determination of the Ukrainian people to defend their liberty forced the Bolsheviks to change their tactics. They decided to postpone their open aggression and instead to appeal directly to the Ukrainian masses.

The Bolsheviks inspired a Congress of workers and peasants to meet at Kiev on December 18, 1917. Contrary to their expectations, a large majority of the delegates took an energetic stand for the right of the Rada to represent the Ukrainian people. Only 80 out of a total of 2,000 delegates supported the Bolsheviks. This small minority proceeded to Kharkov, where the Congress of Proletarians (radical elements from Donez Basin, mostly non-Ukrainians), was held. At the session of Decemer 27, 1917, this group proclaimed itself the "only representative body" of the Ukraine and issued an appeal for help to the Soviet Government of Russia. Two days later, the Sovnarcom welcomed, in a special resolution, this "new revolutionary Govern-

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[12] In his report "On National Factors in Party and State Development" Stalin stated: "Do not forget such reserves as those constituted by the oppressed peoples, who remain silent, but whose very silence exerts pressure and decides much. This is often not felt, but these peoples live, they exist, and they must not be forgotten. Yes, Comrades, it is dangerous to forget them. Do not forget that if in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenich we had not had the so-called 'aliens,' the oppressed people who disorganized the rear of these generals by their tacit sympathy for the Russian proletarians —comrades, this is a specific factor in our development, this tacit sympathy, which nobody hears or sees, but which decides everything—if it were not for this sympathy, we would not have nailed a single one of these generals. While we were advancing on them, their rear was disintegrating. Why? Because these generals depended on the colonizing elements among the Cossacks, they held out to the oppressed peoples the prospect of further oppression, and the oppressed people were therefore *forced* into our arms while we held aloft the banner of the liberation of these oppressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of these generals; those are the factors which, although thy are obscured by the victories of our armies, in the long run decided everything. This must not be forgotten." *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communistícheskoji Partiyi (B), Stenograficheskij otchet, April 17-25, 1923* (Glavpolitprosvet, Moscow, 1923), p. 455.

[13] Both the Soviet ultimatum as well as the answer of the Ukrainian Government is cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918* (New York), pp. 437-438.

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648 668 ment" of the Ukraine and promised it unlimited help.[14] On December 29, 1917, the Red Army under command of former Tsarist Colonel Muraviov invaded the Ukrainian frontiers. The open war between Soviet-Russia and the Ukraine was a reality.[15]

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648 Despite many internal and external difficulties, the Ukrainian Government offered sufficient evidence that the people were capable of governing themselves and of defending their freedom. The Ukraine, by opposing and fighting Bolshevism—increasingly regarded as the new danger to civilization—won the sympathy of many free countries. On January 11, 1918, the French High Commissioner in Kiev, General Tabouis, was instructed by the French Government to accord in its name de-facto recognition of the Ukrainian Independent State. The British Government on January 12, 1918 delegated Bogge, its High Commissioner in Kiev, to wait only for the proper moment to recognize, together with other Allied powers, the Independence of the Ukraine. The United States also considered the recognition of the Ukrainian State after the American Consul General at Moscow informed the Secretary of State of the necessity for such a step.[16]

The Ukrainian Government's efforts to establish friendly relations with foreign countries caused the Bolsheviks to conclude that, despite their promises and changes in method, they were in no position to destroy the power of national revolutions in border countries. Lenin undoubtedly realized that in order to occupy the Ukraine, he must first make peace with external enemies. For this reason he hastened the armistice negotiations, already in progress, with the Central powers at Brest-Litovsk. During the previous negotiations the Soviet delegation, under Joffe's and later under Trotsky's leadership, entirely ignored the existence of an Ukrainian state. They acted as if the Russian delegates were the legal representatives not only of the Rus-

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[14] Stalin's article, "What is Ukrainian Rada?" *Pravda*, December 29 (15 old style), 1917.

[15] At the time when Bolshevik forces terrorized and looted the people of the Ukraine, Stalin wrote: "The people of Russia should know, that the idea of invasion of a foreign territory is strange to the Russian revolution. All people should know, that in contrast to the imperialist policy of national oppression, the Soviet government practices the policy of total liberation." *Pravda*, December 31 (old style), 1917. Cf. J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 25.

[16] *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 655-657.

648 Hetman of the Ukraine (April 29, 1918) did not change the situation, since a large majority of the people considered him head of a puppet government created with the help of German bayonets and, therefore, subservient to German dictation.

After the defeat of the Central powers by the Western allies at the end of 1918, the German sponsored Government was replaced by a new Ukrainian Government called "Directorium" under the leadership of Simon Petliura. At the same time, the Soviet Government annulled the Brest-Litovsk treaty and ordered its military forces to enter the Ukraine. A new war between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia began. Since the Germans had prevented the formation of a Ukrainian army, the Bolsheviks were at an advantage. In desperation, Petliura made a last attempt to combat Bolshevik aggression by concluding a very unfavorable military alliance with the Polish Government under Pilsudski's leadership.[20] The advance of the United Polish-Ukrainian Army during the summer of 1920 was reversed by a Bolshevik counter offensive. As a result, the allied forces were driven out of the Ukraine. Subsequently, the Soviet and Polish Governments agreed, in the treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, to divide the Ukrainian territories between themselves.

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642 668 After the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, Bolsheviks formed an "independent" Soviet Ukrainian Government, the members of which, directly appointed by the Kremlin, were totally subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. At this time, Stalin was in a position to openly reveal the true meaning of the Bolshevik proclamations concerning the right of non-Russian nations to self-determination when he wrote:

> We are in favor of the separation of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and the other colonies from the entente, for here separation implies the liberation of these oppressed countries from Imperialism, thus undermining the position of Imperialism and strengthening the position of revolution. We are against the separation of the border regions from Russia since separation would here involve Imperialist servitude for the border regions, thus undermining the revolutionary power of Russia and strengthening the position of Imperialism.[21]

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[20] Winston S. Churchill attached great importance to this alliance as is obvious from his book, *The Aftermath* (New York, 1929), pp. 277-278.

[21] Stalin's preface to his "Sbornik statei," 1920. Cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 372.

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This explanation of self-determination irritated even the Ukrainian Communists who trusted the Bolshevik slogans and supported Soviet plans during the revolution. Consequently, many of them recognized the new dangers for the Ukrainian people and decided to oppose Russian Imperialism by using the Ukrainian Communist Party as a stronghold against the Centralist attitude of the Russian Communist Party.

The open conflict between Ukrainian and Russian Communists which endangered the unity of the proletarian dictatorship arose during the sessions of the 10th Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party. At this Congress, Ukrainian Communist Zatonskyj, delivered a lengthy speech, accusing the Russian Communists of leaning on traditional Russian chauvinistic forces which ignore the gravity of national movements that had arisen during the revolution. He warned that the Ukrainian masses are aware of their national consciousness and would not tolerate a new Russian oppression.[22]

The Ukrainian Bolshevik Skrypnyk, an old friend and co-worker of Lenin, also accused the majority of the members of the Russian Communist Party of chauvinism. He courageously emphasized that the national question was one of the most dangerous problems, one which should be solved if the Soviet Government were to secure its power. Answering these warnings, Stalin bluntly replied that the Bolshevik Party had taken final leave of obsolescent views on self-determination and was not willing to return to this question.[23] However, he advised the Party members to be cautious in dealing with the national problem since the existence of the non-Russian nations could not be denied. The Soviet leaders openly demonstrated that the formal recognition of the Soviet Ukraine as an "independent" state was only a Kremlin maneuver to soften anti-Communist feeling among

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[22] Zatonsky further declared: "At present, Russianism received even more rights and began to flourish with a new strength. It exists everywhere and especially among the masses of our Party members; it exists not only in the border regions such as Turkestan among the Russian colonizing elements, who were forced to accept Communism, but it exists here in Moscow in our Central administration. . . . We have to erase from the minds of our comrades the image of the Soviet Federation as a Russian one, since the question is not whether it is a Russian but whether it is a Soviet Federation. When for example, Rumania or Germany or any other country becomes a member of the Soviet Federation will it also be called 'Russian?' Of course not! . . ." *X. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiji (B), March 8-16, 1921*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Moscow, 1921), p. 110.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

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● 668 the Ukrainian people. This was especially obvious when the Congress adopted a resolution calling for the liquidation of the "independence" of various Soviet Republics because, the Soviet leaders claimed, "not a single Soviet Republic, taken alone, can regard itself as secure against economic exhaustion and military destruction on the part of world Imperialism."[24] In order to eliminate the potential opposition and distrust among the non-Russian Communists, the Congress formally condemned Great Russian chauvinism as harmful, because of its colonizing spirit, to the cause of Communism. This condemnation, however, did not have any practical significance. The Soviet Commissars in the Ukraine continued the policy of strict centralization and Russification. The Ukrainian Communists could not tolerate this policy without losing face; and they demanded that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party recall its Commissars. This demand was flatly rejected by the Kremlin with an admonition: the Soviet officials in the Ukraine must be accepted as the only executive force. Much to Lenin's surprise, the Ukrainian Communist Party at the end of 1921 dismissed the Kremlin-appointed Commissars from their duties and elected members from their own ranks for the important positions. This independent attitude of the Ukrainian Communists annoyed the Russian leaders so much that Lenin was obliged to intervene personally in the matter. In his speech at the eleventh Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party, Lenin warned that, despite the recognition of the Ukraine as an independent Soviet Republic, the Bolsheviks would not permit Ukrainian leaders to deviate from the Party principles. Lenin further informed the Congress that he had assigned "Comrade" Ordzonikidze and the Central Committee to investigate the whole matter. He admitted that, according to them, it would require ten years to compile a detailed report on the events in the Ukraine. "One thing," Lenin said, "is clear, that despite the unanimously-adopted instructions of the Central Committee, the group (appointed by the Kremlin) was replaced by the local group."[25]

642 The internal difficulties and independent attitude taken by the non-
668 Russian Communists forced the Soviet leaders in Moscow to press their original plan of more centralization. On December 29, 1922, the plenipotentiary delegates of the Russian (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukrain-

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[24] "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in Connection with the National Problem" Resolution adopted by the Tenth Congress.

[25] *XI. Sjezd Rossijskoj Communisticheskoj Partiyi (B) March 27-April 1922,* Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow), p. 31.

ian (UKR.S.S.R.), the Byelo-Russian (W.R.S.S.R.) and the Trans- 642
caucasian (T.S.F.S.R.—Georgia, Azerbaidzan and Armenia) Socia- 668
list Republics concluded, under Moscow's auspices, a treaty providing amalgamation into a single federated state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The terms of the treaty gave the Central Soviet Government in Moscow practically unlimited power.[26] The Russian Communist Party secured its legal right to intervene in the internal affairs of the member States and to suppress the opposition against Moscow among the non-Russian Communists. However, the non-Russian leaders of the Soviet Republics were reluctant to surrender their positions and the struggle between Russian and non-Russian Communists continued with even more fervor.

The controversy over the national policy reached its climax at the 668
twelfth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party. In his report, Stalin spoke at length on the internal and international significance of the national question.[27] For the first time he attacked not only Great Russian chauvinism but also local nationalism as an equal danger to the Soviet regime. Referring to the penetration of elements with a Great Russian spirit into the highest ranks of the Communist Party, Stalin said:

> It is not accidental, comrades, that the Smenovekhists[28] have recruited a large number of supporters from among the Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messrs. the Smenovekhists are lauding the Bolshevik Communists, saying, as it were, 'You may talk as much as you like about Bolshevism, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that what Denikin failed to do, you will do; that you, Bolsheviks have resurrected, or at least are going to resurrect the great idea of a Great Russia.'[29]

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[26] The Russian Communist Party was in a position to adopt any resolution, since the great majority of the Party members were Russians. At the eleventh Congress, for example, when the question of amalgamation of the republics was raised and the resolution for strict centralization approved, the delegates consitted of 341 Russians, 77 Jews, 10 Tartars, 12 Armenians, 9 Georgians, 19 Latvians, 8 Kirghizs and 46 others.

[27] *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B)*, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

[28] ". . . Smenovechovzy—former members of the White Army who now recognized the victory of the Red Army as a national victory, the deliverance of Russia from western Europe, and the birth of a new Russian empire of Asiatic orientation . . . (p. 137). . . . The name 'Smenovechovzy' has been coined after a collection of essays entitled 'Smena Vech,' 'the change of signposts' (Prague, 1931). A collection of essays published in 1909, called 'Vechi' advocated a change of policy by the Russian intelligentsia. In the 'Smena Vech' the change was to take the form of recognizing Bolshevism as a national government." (pp. 386-387) W. Gurian, *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice* (New York, 1932).

[29] *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B)*, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

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Stalin further stressed that the promotion of the idea of a single and indivisible Russia would forever forfeit the confidence in Russia of the formerly oppressed people. He admitted that hostile tendencies towards Moscow among non-Russian peoples were growing rapidly, and urged the Congress to adopt every possible measure which would win for the Soviet Government respect and "love" in the Republics and which would also make the Soviet Government not merely Russian, but international.

Russian chauvinism had also been bitterly attacked by Skrypnyk, who emphasized the inability of Russians to recognize existing facts. He insisted that not one single point of the resolutions adopted at the tenth Congress had been put into effect. He complained that Ukrainians, living in Russia outside the border of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic and numbering approximately 7,000,000 were left in a cultural and educational void and that Ukrainians in the Red Army were under the pressure of forcible Russification. Skrypnyk further declared:

> There exists only a theoretical admission of the national question; when it is time to act, we show neither will nor force. Great state fictions imbibed at the mother's breast have become instinctive among many comrades. We need only to recall how many of our comrades were painfully touched when our Congress accepted the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and not Russian Soviet Socialist Republics.[30]

In addition, Skrypnyk denounced Stalin's attempt to compare Great-Russian chauvinism with the local nationalism of the non-Russian peoples. He claimed that such an interpretation of the problem would encourage the Russians, employing the excuse of fighting local nationalism, to continue their policy of Russification. Even Rakowskyj, the Kremlin-appointed president of the Soviet Ukraine, who previously rejected the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination, changed his mind after facing reality in the Ukraine and declared that the national question, if it remained ignored, was one which could cause Soviet Russia and the Party tremendous difficulties. He warned that, should the Russians continue the policy of oppression, civil war would be resumed, with even firmer effort on the part of the non-Russian peoples to secede from Russia. Rakowskyj energetically besought a practical solution, based on factual equality, of the problem. With regard to the Ukrainian language, the President stated:

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[30] *Ibid.*, p. 522.

> I heard talks among our comrades, that the Ukrainian language is nothing but a fiction of the Galicians (Western Ukrainians). Does this not demonstrate the Great-Russian power feelings of the Russian men, who never experienced a national oppression but on the contrary oppressed other nationalities for hundreds of years?[31]

Answering these warnings and accusations, Stalin replied:

> Besides the right of nations to self-determination, there exists also the right of the working class to consolidate its power and to establish the dictatorship, and to this latter right the right of self-determination is subordinate.[32]

The twelfth Congress passed another resolution on the "National Question," in which the Russian Communist Party pledged to free itself from Russian chauvinism. However, the most important decision of the twelfth Congress was the adoption of the so-called Ukrainianization policy. According to this policy, all Party and State institutions in the Ukraine were advised to use and to promote the Ukrainian language in dealing with the people. The reason behind the acceptance of this policy, was obvious: the Communist Party in the Ukraine could not win influence among the Ukrainian people, since the peasants referred to it as a Russian Party, interested only in the exploitation of their country.[33] By introducing the new policy the Soviet leaders hoped to establish closer contact with the masses. But Ukrainianization became national and revolutionary in substance. In 1925-26, a well-organized opposition group of Ukrainian Communists, led by Shumskyj, Maximovich, Khvylovyj, Volobuyev and others, advocated a type of national Communism which in today's language could be labeled as "Titoism." Volobuyev went so far as to declare that the Soviet Russian economic policy was nothing but a colonial exploitation of the Ukrainian people.

The Kremlin was alerted. The Soviet Russian leaders were aware of the growing dangers of this opposition in the Soviet Republics but were unable to take effective action to combat it. The Russian Com-

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[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 528-534.

[32] Cf. J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. V (Moscow, 1947), p. 265.

[33] At the twelfth Congress the delegates were composed as follows: 60.8% Russians, 11.3% Jews, 7.1% Latvians and Estonians, 4.7% Ukrainians, 2.7% Georgians, 2.4% Armenians, 1.2% Byelo-Russians, 1.7% Kirghiz, 1% Tartars, 7.1% others.

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668 munist Party was itself in a very serious crisis. After Lenin's death on January 21, 1924, the top Party officials struggled among themselves for political leadership. For this reason, the national question was not even raised at the fourteenth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party held on December 18 to 31, 1925. The Congress was entirely occupied with ironing out the sharp split within the Party. Despite the strong opposition lead by Sinoviev and Kamenev, who fought for a collective responsibility of the Politburo, the Congress made Stalin the individual dictator of the Party, giving him unrestricted authority.[34]

668 517 Utilizing this struggle between the Russian Communists, Ukrainian writers and historians wrote and published new literature about their past and inspired resistance to Moscow's domination. One of the most influential among these writers with the courage to reject openly Moscow's right to dominate his people was Mykola Khvylovyj. During the revolution he was among the Ukrainian Communists who were misled by Bolshevik slogans and took active part in the struggle against the "bourgeois" national Government of the Ukraine. He believed in the international program of the Russian Communist Party which promised the people "land, liberty and friendship among nations." Under the impact of existing developments, however, Khvylovyj realized that the Russian Bolsheviks nurtured the idea of the "single and indivisible Russia" and that only the forms of oppression were changed. His conclusion was based upon the fact that the Bolshevik recognition of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was composed of empty phrases and deceptions since the real political force in the Ukraine was concentrated in Russian hands. Khvylovyj now openly declared that his people could survive as a nation and live in freedom and peace only if they are able to secede from Russia. His appeal, "Away from Moscow, back to Europe," was received by Ukrainians with enthusiasm and by the Soviet leaders with considerable anxiety. Referring to the dangerous influence of Khvylovyj's writings, Stalin wrote:

> Khvylovyj's demand for "The immediate russification of the proletariat" of the Ukraine, his opinion that "Ukrainian poetry must get

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[34] For the story of Stalin's seizure of power see: *XIV. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), December 18-31, 1925,* Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1926), pp. 207-298.

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> away from the Russian literature and its style as quickly as possible," his 668 ● assertion that "the ideas of the proletariat are known to us without Moscow art," his enthusiasm for a sort of Messianic role of the "young" 517 Ukrainian intelligentsia and his ludicrous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this, and much like it, in the mouth of a Ukrainian Communist now sounds (must sound) more than strange. Whereas the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are full of sympathy for "Moscow" the citadel of the international revolutionary movement and of Leninism, whereas the proletarians of Western Europe turn with joy toward the banner waving over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovyj has nothing better to say for "Moscow" than to appeal to Ukrainian public men to get away from "Moscow as quickly as possible!" And this is called internationalism! What can we say of other Ukrainian intellectuals, not belonging to the Communist camp, if Communists begin to talk, and not only talk, but also to write in our Soviet press, in the language of Comrade Khvylovyj?[35]

Despite the fact that the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic secured for Moscow centralized power, internal developments in the Ukraine were at first not affected as much as many Russian Communists anticipated. On the contrary, the first years of Union status were marked by the promotion of Soviet Ukrainian statehood. Alongside the Kremlin's appointed Commissariats, the Ukraine possessed a well-organized administration of its own and its "Government" took very seriously the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. Kharkov and later Kiev defended the interests of the Ukraine with steadfast determination. The growth of a Ukrainian culture national in substance, fostered by Khvylovyj, progressed so rapidly that Stalin was again stirred to an open admission of its danger when he said in 1929:

> If we had nothing else but these discussions about Khvylovyj, which have become so wide and heated in the Ukraine, there would already be enough for profound alarm.[36]

The national question was once again raised at the sixteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. Stalin proposed a new 668 Nationalities' policy which would promote a culture socialistic in sub-

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[35] J. V. Stalin's letter "To Comrade Kaganovich and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of Ukraine," dated April 26, 1926, first published in a complete form in *Sotchineniya*, Vol. VIII (Moscow, 1948), pp. 149-154.

[36] Cf. Mykola Sciborsky, *Ukraine and Russia* (New York, 1940), p. 43.

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stance and national only in form. He demanded severe punishment of the advocates of national cultures with hostile tendencies toward Moscow. Postishev, Stalin's deputy in the Ukraine, informed the Congress about the already successful suppression and persecution of the Ukrainian national movement. But he added that many Russian intellectuals in the Ukraine, encouraged by this new policy, suggested that even the Ukrainian language should be supplanted in schools by some kind of new language, possibly Esperanto.[37] He also stated that under the pressure of the Communist Party, the deviationists, Shumskyj and Khvylovyj, admitted their errors and acknowledged the correctness of the Party policy.

At this Congress, new factors relating to Ukrainian-Soviet difficulties were introduced. For the first time in the existence of the Soviet regime, Postishev reported that the O.G.P.U. had uncovered a counter-revolutionary organization in the Ukraine called the "Ukrainian National Socialist Party." Many of the members of this organization, according to Postishev, were Ukrainian Communists. Its primary aim was to form an Independent Democratic Republic. Kaganovich, another Kremlin deputy in the Ukraine, revealed the existence of a second conspiratory counter-revolutionary organization with headquarters in the Ministry of Agriculture.[38] Skrypnyk made a vain attempt to rescue the situation. He blamed Russian chauvinism for the rebirth of Ukrainian nationalism and made clear that the continuation of Soviet-Russian policy in the Ukraine would force more and more Ukrainians into the underground. Skrypnyk complained that the declaration of the right of nations, set forth on November 15, 1917, proved to be for many Russians merely a screen behind which Moscow had hidden a plan for further oppression. For many Russians, he stressed, it was only a tactical maneuver, but for the non-Russian nations, it was a most important document. No wonder, Skrypnyk added, that some Russians go so far as to declare that this important declaration of our Party was valid only until the October revolution, and that after October, it should be considered as a counter-revolutionary slogan. Skrypnyk concluded, "There cannot even be a discussion about any revision of Lenin's policy, nor of any

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[37] *XVI. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiji (B), June 26-July13, 1930,* Stenograficheski otchet, Partizdat (Moscow, 1930), p. 108.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

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restrictions, and still less about liquidation of the national federative and autonomous republics."[39]

Aware of the dangerous position in which he placed himself by accusing Russian "Comrades" of chauvinism at a time when Stalin already belonged to that camp, Skrypnyk could not afford to fail to attack the deviationist tendencies of some Ukrainian "Comrades" in the Party. He pledged to help persecute without mercy all elements with nationalistic leanings.

At the beginning of 1930 the Soviet Secret Police uncovered the existence of another Ukrainian conspiratory organization called "Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy" (The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine). The forty-day trial that followed in one of Kharkov's largest theaters disclosed that the organization's political aim was the restoration of the Independent National Ukrainian State and that it was in contact with the Ukrainian political emigrees.[40] More than forty-five well known Ukrainians, among them members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In addition, some 4,000 members of the Youth Organization, Comsomol, were arrested. But in 1931 the OGPU uncovered still another revolutionary organization called the "National Center." The anti-Soviet underground activities in Ukraine were supported by peasants who opposed the forcible collectivization of land introduced by Bolsheviks with the five year plan in 1928-29.

In spite of all these crises and belligerent relationships between Kiev and Moscow, Skrypnyk continued to advocate the conception of Soviet Ukrainian Statehood, an idea which by now was entirely in contradiction to the official Soviet viewpoint. When he finally demanded the formation of a special Ukrainian Red Army, and the incorporation of the Ukrainian territories still under Russian administration into the Ukraine, Stalin lost his patience and summoned Skrypnyk to Moscow for an explanation. After his return in July, 1933, Skrypnyk (a member of the Communist Party since 1897, coworker of Lenin, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, head of the Council of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. and Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic) committed suicide, according to the official anouncement. After his death, he was accused of Ukrainian nationalistic leanings and of treasonable disloyalty to

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 243.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

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● 668 the cause of Leninism. Only a few weeks before Skrypnyk's death, Khvylovyj, long the subject of refined persecution by the Soviet authorities, had been driven to commit suicide (May, 1933). According to information provided by his close friends, Khvylovyj left a note saying "I am dying because I love life."

668 Acting upon Stalin's order to persecute Ukrainian "nationalism," Postishev stated, in a report to the plenary session of the Ukrainian
661 Communist Party, November 19, 1933, that the discovery of Skrypnyk's deviation? led to the purging from the Ukrainian Socialist culture of any adherence to Petliura's, Machno's and other national elements. He also declared that within a few months 27,000 members, out of a total membership of 125,000 were expelled from the party, along with 1,300 members of the Comsomol. Relieved of their posts were 240 secretaries of regional committees of the Communist Party, 250 heads of "Ispolkoms," 150 heads of controlling committees, about 1,000 officials of the Commissariat of Education, about 2,000 co-operative workers and 300 professors of various educational institutions beginning with the Ukrainian Academy of Science.[41]

Despite the increase of physical and moral terrorism, Moscow did not succeed in eliminating resistance to its rule in the Ukraine. Early in 1933 the Soviet Secret Police reported the existence of a new well-organized and disciplined underground organization, this time the "Ukrainian Military Organization," whose large membership included commanders of the Red Army, scientific workers and young intelligentsia. The aim of this group was similar to that of the ones previously uncovered, excepting that the Ukrainian Military Organization was preparing a military revolt against the existing order.

The Soviet difficulties in the Ukraine were again illustrated at the seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. In his report on the dangerous developments in Ukraine, Stalin stated:

> The fall of Skrypnyk and his group in the Ukraine is not exceptional. Similar 'dislocations' are observable among certain comrades in other national republics.[42]

Describing the spread of local nationalism and labeling it as far more perilous for the Soviet rule than Russian chauvinism, Stalin continued:

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[41] Sciborsky, *Ukraine and Russia, op. cit.*, p. 51.

[42] *XVII. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B). January 26-February 10, 1934.* Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1934), p. 30.

?[cf. category 116, pp. 220-222 — Analyst]

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> Only very recently, in the Ukraine, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the major danger; but when we ceased to fight it and enabled it to grow to the extent that it joined forces with the interventionists, this deviation became the major danger.[43]

The discussion of the national question was brought to a final halt at the seventeenth Congress and the Soviet Government decided to use police terror against the opposition.[44] Following this policy, new purges were instigated and every sign of dissatisfaction with the Bolshevik order was simply suppressed by Stalin's GPU.

The various stages of Soviet tactics in regard to the national policy—the recognition of the independent National Republics, the formation of the Soviet Republics, the amalgamation of the Soviet Republics into a single Union on the basis of a "free" federation, and the liquidation of the formal "Independence" of the Republics—practically places the Russian Communists in the role of promoters of the idea of a "single and indivisible Russia" despite the Bolsheviks' attempts to demonstrate the Soviet regime as an inter-nationalist one The Soviet leaders started from the point where the Tsarist and Provisional governments ended and gradually arrived at the stage of strict centralization and oppression—with only the provision that the Kremlin was no longer in a position to deny, at least theoretically, the existence of the Ukrainian nation and language. The Soviet Russian press, however, was given, as far back as 1936, a green light to recover from the archives of the past such names as Ivan Kalyta, Ivan the Terrible, Tsar Peter the Great, Katherina II and others.

The struggle against the Ukrainian "nationalists" was carried out until "all" independent elements, including many members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, were executed or silenced. Only after the employment of total terror could the Soviet regime officially "boast"

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[43] Stalin's report, *ibid.*, p. 32.

[44] Describing the tactics of the Ukrainian opposition, Postishev concluded: "The Ukrainian nationalists have an interesting system of distributing their units. Take for example the People's Commissariat of Education. Its director was Yavorsky; Yavorsky went, then came Ozersky; Ozersky went, then came Konyk; all of them proved to be members of the Ukrainian Military Organization, and its leaders at that. Or take the case of the one with the power of attorney in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. There you had Maximovich; Maximovich went, then came Petrenko; Petrenko went, then came Tur—again all members of the UWO (Ukrainian Military Organization), even of its directing clique. It was the same in all the places which they controlled. They maintained the principle of always substituting their own people. Once they got control of a responsible department, they would not let it out of their hands." Postishev's report, *ibid.*, p. 70.

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● 668 661 of the triumph and success of "brotherly" cooperation among various nations under the leadership of the great Russian people and the "wisest" Stalin. Nevertheless, these proclamations of co-operation were soon negated by existing facts. Again *Pravda* reported new anti-Soviet activity of the "enemies of the People" in the youth organization (Comsomol) in the Ukraine:

> There is uncovered again the unseemly sight of the work of counter-revolutionaries and spies within the Comsomol of the Ukraine. Masking themselves in a base fashion, they carry on disruptive counter-revolutionary work. They consciously fouled the cadres of the Comsomol and the propaganda apparatus and they ruined political education. They served the fascists, conducted spying activities and prepared sabotage and terroristic acts. . . . These enemies of the people placed their own men in executive posts. When these men fell at one post they were immediately transferred into another region.[45]

The resistance of the Ukrainians to Moscow's domination could not be denied. However, such statements had double meaning and were produced by the Soviet press in order to justify the policy of strict centralization and Russification in the Ukraine. Even such a loyal Moscow servant as Liubchenko, President of the Soviet Ukraine, was by now considered as a dangerous and undesirable individual since he was a Ukrainian and could hinder, as Skrypnyk did in the past, the realization of the Soviet Russian policy. For this reason he was compelled to commit suicide on September 11, 1937. In the familiar Bolshevik manner, the Soviet press informed the people that Liubchenko was involved in anti-Soviet connections and, "evidently" afraid to face his responsibility before the Ukrainian people for betraying their interests, had ended his life. Such an interpretation of Liubchenko's death—who in 1934 had praised the GPU for its successful work in "totally" destroying the "nationalist" groups within the Ukrainian Communist Party—gave the Soviet regime the "legal" right to replace most Ukrainians holding higher positions in the Soviet administration by Russians whom the Kremlin could trust. Nevertheless, passive resistance to the existing order was continually felt and could not be wiped out entirely.

186 In 1938 world tension and fear of World War II increased. Therefore, even the rise of national consciousness in the small Carp-

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[45] *Pravda*, July 25, 1937.

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orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced
that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which
Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668 ●
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

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THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

661 668 423 Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, p-p. 130-131 --Analyst]
[2] [Cf. cat. 642, p 128 -- Analyst 1932]

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that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Russian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale. 661 186 665

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight [563] against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools.

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organization of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nationalist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union. 661 665 668

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

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after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrain-
661 ian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in
665 the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged
668 in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers,
● Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

[539] The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

THE UKRAINE

Stalin and his collaborators see the essence of the Ukrainian prob- S.U.
lem in the same way as Gogol[1] did by considering it basically as a 635
struggle of Taras against Andriy, the Russian conception of the 186
Ukraine against the Western conception. Krushchov was right in evok- UK.
ing the parallel of Taras Bulba because under the Soviet régime Taras, 661
the faithful watchman in the South of the 'Russian faith' and the 668
'Russian Czar', once again killed Andriy when he became attracted by 665
the West and ready to desert both faith and 'Czar'.

Krushchov as party secretary went on to kill 'Andriys'. His first victims were leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Youth League who were removed from their posts in December 1938, having been apparently overlooked in previous purges. Khrushchov rarely killed in the physical sense; he rather weeded out all influences and tendencies not in conformity with the narrow views which a Soviet Taras Bulba may have on history, literature, education, etc.

COMINTERN AND 'WESTERN UKRAINE'

In all its internal fights against Ukrainian nationalism the Soviet régime SU.
never forgot the 'other Ukraine' beyond the frontiers of the Soviet 648
Union. A geopolitical gesture in the summer of 1934 was especially 563
intended for the attention of this 'other Ukraine'. It was the removal of
the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev, which was equivalent
to the transportation of the centre of gravity of the country from the
Eastern Ukraine to the Western Ukrainian areas near the Polish border.

Kharkov had been made the capital of the Soviet Ukraine in Decem- S.U.
ber 1919, in an attempt to link the administrative centre of the country [361]
as far as possible with the labouring masses of the Donets Basin; but
Kiev was the historic capital and Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, liked
to play up Kiev against Kharkov. This too was checked by the transfer
of the capital. An official Soviet commentator said that the removal of
the Ukrainian Government to Kiev, which was celebrated with music
and dancing, had an 'extraordinary significance' both for the Ukraine
and internationally, and that it was a more important event than the
transfer of Russia's capital from Petrograd to Moscow after the
October Revolution.[8]

This latter remark was true in so far as the shifting of the capital S.U.
constituted a prelude to the annexation by the U.S.S.R. of the Ukrainian [728]
territories of Poland.[2] This annexation carried out in 1939, it should [635]
be well noted, was by no means a triumph of political strategy but was
due to the use of force alone. The failure to win over the population of
the Western Ukraine by peaceful means was probably the greatest
defeat which the Soviet nationalities policy had suffered on Russia's
frontiers.

[1] [Cf. category 116, p134, R1 Sov. Union, --Analyst]
[2] [Cf. category 116, pp. 136 ff --Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
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There was hardly any other territory on the Russian border where the Soviet régime stood such an excellent chance of exploiting social grievances and the discontent of oppressed minorities as in Eastern Poland. Yet the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of Eastern Poland, who according to all logical calculations were bound to become a natural prey to Soviet propaganda, turned away from Russia in protest against compulsory collectivization, political purges and anti-religious propaganda.

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The sympathies which the Soviet Union enjoyed among the poor peasantry of the Western Ukraine in the first years after the October Revolution had almost completely died out by the end of the twenties. Moscow could not even rely on its own 'Communist Party of the Western Ukraine' which frequently took its lead from the anti-Russian 'national deviationists' in the Soviet Ukraine. When the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine split at the beginning of 1928 into 'loyal communists' and Ukrainian nationalists, the latter, led by Vasilkov, had the majority in the Central Committee. The Vasilkov group, said the Comintern organ, *Communist International*, 'was consciously counter-revolutionary and carried out wrecking work and provocations'.[9]

The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had hardly been reorganized when several party groups again fell victims to Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism. In 1935 the official Comintern organ complained about the absence of 'a national liberation struggle on a large scale in both the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia', meaning, of course, a pro-Soviet national liberation struggle.[10]

In 1938 the Comintern journal was forced to admit that the nationalist anti-Soviet organization U.N.D.O., which stood for Ukrainian autonomy inside Poland, was backed by broad masses of the people of the Western Ukraine and that the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had not succeeded 'in penetrating the organizations of Ukrainian nationalists'. The Western Ukrainian Communist Party finally found itself compelled to exchange its demand for self-determination for a demand for autonomy which had been originally branded as a 'bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogan'.[11]

The full extent of the political defeat suffered by Soviet Russia and Comintern propaganda in the Western Ukraine can be realized if one takes into account the active persecution which the Polish authorities conducted against Ukrainian nationalism, the punitive expeditions which they carried out against recalcitrant Ukrainian villages and the almost total disregard of the Polish Government for the cultural needs of the Polish Ukrainians. All these hardships which the Ukrainians of Poland suffered in the inter-war period were insufficient to promote any major co-operation between them and the Soviet régime.

affairs, Soviet policy in Transcarpathian Ukraine kept a certain balance S.U. 563 between Russian and Ukrainian cultural work in the new province. Russian books and Russian newspapers are now being printed there side by side with Ukrainian ones.

COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE

The annexation of the Western Ukraine, whilst increasing on the one UK. 728 hand the might of the Soviet Empire and improving its strategic position, at the same time delayed the internal political consolidation of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Owing to its notable past failures the Communist Party machinery UK. 665 found it difficult to take root among the people of the Western Ukraine – even after its incorporation into the U.S.S.R. In each of the nine Western Ukrainian provinces (six from Poland, two from Rumania and one from Czechoslovakia), the Communist Party could rely only upon a few thousand loyal Bolsheviks. Thus in the large province of Rovno (formerly Polish), the Communist Party early in 1948 had but 6,000 members of whom more than half joined during the war and in the post-war period.[15] In the Transcarpathian Ukraine the party had in December 1946 only 4,000 members, about one-half per cent of the entire population.[16] This figure included not only local communists but also party and state officials who had come to the province in considerable numbers from beyond the Carpathians.

Together with a minute number of people who could be considered UK. 668 reliable from the Soviet standpoint, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in absorbing the new territories took over a large number of people with a Western anti-Soviet outlook, particularly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian intellectuals. This fresh accession of Ukrainian nationalist elements also encouraged the opposition forces in the 'Old Ukraine'. The great prominence of the historic vanguard role of the Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound to make itself felt inside the Soviet Ukraine as well. Years of Rumanian and Polish oppression had been unable to obliterate the importance of Western Ukrainian cultural nationalism which had unfolded itself before 1918 under the liberal rule of the Hapsburg monarchy. The Ukrainian nation was, indeed, a recognized political and cultural fact inside the Austrian Empire at a time when Czarist Russia denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation.

Lvov in Galicia and Chernovitsy in the Bukovina had been centres of a legal Ukrainian national movement and of an openly professed Ukrainian culture long before Kiev and Kharkov. The Western Ukraine had not known that revolutionary Ukrainian-Russian comradeship-in-arms

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

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UK. 668 which had existed in Ukraine proper, and the Western Ukrainian, quite understandably, never felt that he owed anything to Russia and to the Russians. This mentality of the Western Ukrainian, who had outspoken leanings towards independence, was bound to create considerable difficulties inside the Soviet Ukraine.

The Soviet Government set itself the task of counteracting the recalcitrant Western Ukrainian spirit and of levelling out the differences existing between the 'liberated Western Ukraine' and the rest of the Ukraine in the cultural, economic and political sphere.

RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE UNIATE CHURCH

UK. 795 S.U. 795 After the liquidation of all openly anti-Bolshevik movements in the Western Ukraine and the annihilation of the 'class enemy' in the form of the bourgeoisie and the 'kulaks', there still remained for subjection to the 'levelling-out process' one important bulwark of Westernism: the Uniate Church with over 3,500,000 followers in Eastern Galicia and several hundred thousand in the Bukovina and the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

The Uniate Church had come into existence at the end of the sixteenth century in the interest and under the influence of the Polish State. As time went on the Uniate Church developed into something more than the artificial creation of a ruling caste. It was, in the end, the true expression of an area which is neither West nor East since the Uniate Church combined Eastern rites with a Western cultural and ecclesiastical orientation symbolized by the recognition of the Roman Pope.

S.U. [175] The struggle between Poland and Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though essentially a political one, was largely conducted under the cloak of religious differences. Russia claimed that her aim was to emancipate the Orthodox population of Eastern Poland from 'temptation and humiliation' by the Poles. To push back the influence of the 'Polish' Roman Catholic Church and to carry out the liquidation of the Uniate Church were thus major objectives which Russia pursued in the three partitions of Poland. The Empress Catherine II proclaimed in 1794 that resistance to the reunion of Uniates and Roman Catholics with the Orthodox Church in the territories conquered from the Poles was a criminal offence; and thus about 2,000,000 Roman Catholics and Uniates were 'persuaded' to embrace the Orthodox Church of their ancestors in the course of a few weeks. A church council of the Uniates held in Polotsk in Byelorussia (White Russia) in 1839 brought 1,500,000 Uniates together with their bishops back into the fold of Orthodoxy. In 1874 the last Uniate diocese of Kholm was abolished and 500,000 Uniates willy-nilly transformed into Orthodox congregations.